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1. The unavailability of ‘indefinite’ readings for implicit arguments 
 
1.1 Meteorological predicates : the standard view 
 
The received view about meteorological predicates like ‗rain‘ is that they carry an argument 
slot for a location which can be filled either explicitly by means of an adverbial phrase, as in 
(1), or implicitly by a contextually determined location, as in (2). This means that a location 
has to be contextually provided when none is explicitly mentioned. 
 
(1) It‘s raining here/in Paris. 
(2) It‘s raining. 
 
More precisely, the standard view assumes that ‗rain‘, in the absence of an explicit location, 
demands that the context provide a specific location. The possibility that the sentence ‗It is 
                                                 
1
 I am indebted to Luisa Marti, Paul Elbourne, and the participants in my graduate seminar at 
Harvard University (fall 2004), especially Pranav Anand, for discussions that led to this 
paper. Thanks are also due to Philippe Schlenker and, again, to Paul Elbourne for comments 
on a first draft. A second draft benefitted from comments by Luisa Marti, Eros Corazza, Polly 
Jacobson (acting as substitute for a defecting referee), Jason Stanley, and an anonymous 
referee for this journal who provided extraordinarily detailed remarks and suggestions, based 
on a thorough knowledge of the relevant literature. Thanks to him or her  — I learnt a lot from 
reading his or her comments (much more than the necessarily limited acknowledgments in the 
text actually suggest). 
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raining‘ might express a location-indefinite content is considered as ruled out. This introduces 
an interesting asymmetry between the implicit and the explicit ; for, on the side of the explicit, 
we find two sorts of cases : the ‗definite‘ or ‗singular‘ cases in which a particular location is 
mentioned, as in (1), and the ‗indefinite‘ or ‗general‘ cases in which there is quantification 
over locations, as in (3a) and (3b) : 
 
(3a) It‘s raining somewhere 
(3b) It‘s raining in all major cities 
 
 There are different ways of implementing the standard view. Some theorists hold that 
in logical form ‗rain‘ is associated with a covert pronominal element — a location variable —
which can either be saturated by means of an overt locative phrase, or be left unsaturated (in 
which case the free variable receives a specific value from the extralinguistic context). One 
may also treat ‗rain‘ as a predicate exhibiting variable polyadicity : when the location is 
explicit, as in (1), the predicate takes a location argument ; but when it is left implicit, as in 
(2), the location is part of the context (rather than part of the content) and ‗rain‘ functions as 
an indexical : it expresses a definite content only with respect to a context centered on a 
particular location. (This, in effect, amounts to treating ‗rain‘ as a part-time indexical, in the 
terminology of Recanati 2001). 
 If, like Stanley (2000), we take ‗rain‘ to be associated with a covert pronominal 
element in logical form, we will not be surprised by the asymmetry I mentioned above. For 
pronouns do have the property that, when unbound, they must be contextually assigned a 
specific value : ‗He is tall‘ can never mean that some male or other is tall. The view that ‗rain‘ 
is a part-time indexical also predicts the asymmetry ; for indexicals do require that the context 
provide a specific value for the contextual parameter on which their semantic value depends. 
 
1.2  Overt binding of implicit arguments 
 
The asymmetry between the explicit and the implicit when it comes to the availability of 
indefinite readings is a very general phenomenon. If I say that the stool is on the left of the 
table, I do not explicitly mention the perspective (as I would if I said ‗The stool is on the left 
of the table from my perspective‘), but a perspective has to be contextually provided. What 
has to be provided is a definite perspective : my utterance cannot mean that the stool is on the 
left of the table from some perspective or other. Yet if we make the perspective explicit, we 
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can introduce this ‗indefinite‘ reading : nothing prevents me from saying ‗The stool is on the 
left of the table from some perspective or other‘. 
 In a justly famous paper, Barbara Partee argued that implicit variables, like explicit 
variables, can be bound and do not need to be assigned specific values (Partee 1989 ; see also 
Mitchell 1987 and Nunberg 1992). Does this contradict my claim regarding the unavailability 
of indefinite readings for implicit arguments ? I do not think so. Partee was concerned with 
cases like (4)-(6), in which the expression carrying the implicit argument occurs in a 
quantified context. 
 
(4) For many arab countries, America is the enemy [of those countries] 
(5) Wherever I go, it rains [there] 
(6) Whenever a secretary made a mistake the others did not notice [the mistake] 
 
In those cases, the binder is explicit, even if the bindee is an implicit argument. The implicit 
argument is overtly quantified over. But my claim regarding the unavailability of indefinite 
readings concerns arguments that are ‗implicit‘ in the (strong) sense that they are neither 
overtly mentioned nor overtly quantified over.  In (1) the location argument is overtly 
mentioned (by means of the phrase ‗here/in Paris‘). In (3) and (5) the location argument is 
overtly quantified over (by means of the phrases ‗somewhere‘, ‗in all major cities‘ and 
‗wherever I go‘). In (2), however, the location argument which the context provides is neither 
overtly mentioned, nor overtly quantified over. According to the standard view, no indefinite 
reading is possible for the implicit location argument in (2). 
 In this article I will argue that the standard view is actually mistaken, and that an 
indefinite reading is available for (2). But I maintain that implicit arguments, when they exist, 
cannot be given indefinite readings. (What I will deny, therefore, is that ‗rain‘ carries an 
implicit location argument.) Thus consider the expression ‗home‘. When the person whose 
home is in question is not explicitly specified, it is contextually provided qua implicit 
argument. Thus ‗John is home‘ can mean that John is at John‘s home or that he is at the 
speaker‘s (or rather : the speaker‘s and hearer‘s) home, depending on the context.2 It is also 
possible for the implicit argument to be overtly bound, as in ‗Everybody‘s home‘ : on one 
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 As Polly Jacobson pointed out to me, the value for the implicit argument can only be either 
John (the preferred reading, according to her) or the pair consisting of the speaker and the 
hearer. See Fillmore 1997 : 90-96 for discussion of the complex behavior of ‗home‘. 
  4 
reading, that means that for all x, x is at x‘s home. What is not possible is to use ‗John is 
home‘ to mean that he is at someone or other’s home. Similarly, ‗John is faraway‘ cannot 
mean that he is faraway from some place or other ; the location he is faraway from (typically 
but not necessarily the place of utterance) must be contextually specified. 
  
1.3 Two types of implicit argument ? 
 
According to Fillmore (1969, 1986), there are two sorts of implicit arguments, and the feature 
I have mentioned (the unavailability of indefinite readings) characterizes only one of them : 
the ‗definite‘ implicit arguments. The other category is that of ‗indefinite‘ implicit arguments. 
Intransitive ‗eat‘ is a case in point : it carries an indefinite implicit argument. Thus ‗John is 
eating‘ means that he is eating something or other. 
 Fillmore construes the two categories as mutually exclusive, but there are implicit 
arguments that allow for both possibilities. Relational nouns such as ‗mother‘, ‗father‘ and 
‗husband‘, in the absence of an explicit complement, can be understood either way. In (7) the 
implicit argument of ‗mother‘ is definite, while in (8) it is indefinite. 
 
(7) Whenever a baby started crying, the mother went to comfort it. 
(8) The toystore was full of parents in search of gifts. The mothers were especially 
interested in educational games. 
 
Similarly, even though ‗local‘ is often (indeed, always) treated as requiring a specific implicit 
argument when unbound, as it does in (9), it also accepts indefinite readings, as in (10):
3
 
 
(9) I spent the summer vacation in Nice and I enjoyed reading the local newspaper 
everyday. 
(10) Mary collects local newspapers. 
  
 I do not intend to deny the facts on which Fillmore‘s distinction is based : there are 
indeed two types of case, as he points out. But I use ‗implicit argument‘ in such a way that 
only one of the two types deserves that name. My reason for so doing is that, whenever an 
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 I owe this observation to Orin Percus, who gave an example like (10) in a discussion during 
the 2004 Milan Meeting on covert variables.  
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alleged implicit argument can be understood indefinitely, an alternative analysis is available, 
which dispenses with implicit arguments altogether. Thus intransitive ‗eat‘ arguably denotes a 
property, which we can define by existentially quantifying one argument of the two-place 
relation denoted by transitive ‗eat‘. That is, in effect, what Quine‘s Der operator does (Quine 
1960: 229-231) : applied to any n-place predicate, it yields a n
-1
-place predicate by 
existentially quantifying the last argument-role of the original predicate, according to the 
following schema: 
 
(Der P) x1...xn-1 iff there is something xn such that Px1...xn 
 
If 'P' is a two-place predicate, like transitive ‗eat‘, then 'Der P' will be a genuine one-place 
predicate, denoting a property rather than a relation. On this view, intransitive ‗eat‘ does not 
denote a relation between the eater and an ‗implicit argument‘ (the food).4 Similarly, in this 
framework, ‗mother‘ will be construed as a polysemous predicate, denoting either a two-place 
relation (whose second argument can be explicit or implicit) or a property that can be defined 
by applying Quine‘s Der operator to the homophonic two-place predicate. No implicit 
argument is involved on the ‗property‘ reading. Likewise, ‗local‘ in (10) will be treated as 
denoting a property on a par with the properties expressed by ‗regional‘, ‗national‘ or 
‗international‘. 
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 As one referee emphasized, this point has been appreciated within the formal semantics 
community for some time. Already in the late 1970‘s Dowty argued that the relation between 
transitive and intransitive ‗eat‘ should be captured by a lexical rule rather than by the earlier 
transformation of ‗indefinite object deletion‘ (Dowty 1978, 1979, 1982). Of course, it is 
possible to maintain that intransitive ‗eat‘ denotes a relation between the eater and the food, 
the difference between the intransitive and the transitive use being that on the intransitive use, 
the second argument of the relation undergoes existential generalization. But the ‗property‘ 
analysis has an advantage over the ‗existential generalization‘ analysis : it correctly predicts 
that the existential quantifier can only take narrow scope (since it is built into the lexical entry 
of the verb on its intransitive reading). On the ‗existential generalization‘ analysis, the 
obligatory narrow scope of the existential quantifier has to be stipulated. See §5.2 for more on 
this issue. 
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2. Implicit arguments vs free enrichment 
 
2.1. The weatherman example 
 
As I have said, I think an indefinite interpretation is available for a simple meteorological 
sentence like (2), an interpretation which makes it equivalent to ‗It‘s raining somewhere‘. In 
Recanati 2002 I gave the following example : 
 
I can imagine a situation in which rain has become extremely rare and important, and 
rain detectors have been disposed all over the territory (whatever the territory — 
possibly the whole Earth). In the imagined scenario, each detector triggers an alarm 
bell in the Monitoring Room when it detects rain. There is a single bell; the location of 
the triggering detector is indicated by a light on a board in the Monitoring Room. 
After weeks of total drought, the bell eventually rings in the Monitoring Room. 
Hearing it, the weatherman on duty in the adjacent room shouts: ‗It‘s raining!‘ His 
utterance is true, iff it is raining (at the time of utterance) in some place or other. 
(Recanati 2002 : 317) 
 
I take this example to cast doubt on the standard view, according to which ‗rain‘ carries an 
argument slot for a location.
5
 On the basis of that type of counterexample, I have put forward 
an alternative proposal regarding ‗rain‘ and other meteorological predicates. The proposal has 
two sides : 
 
• On the semantic side, ‗rain‘ is treated as a zero-place predicate (just as intransitive ‗eat‘ is a 
one-place predicate and transitive ‗eat‘ a two-place predicate). No location argument is 
involved in the argument structure of the predicate. 
• On the pragmatic side, a process of free enrichment (often) takes place, in virtue of which 
the meaning of an utterance involving the ‗rain‘ predicate is made contextually more specific 
than the semantic content determined by the literal meaning of the sentence. More precisely, 
through that process of free enrichment the meaning of the utterance is made location-
specific, even though the sentence itself involves no (overt or covert) reference to a place. 
                                                 
5
 Of course, there are ways of defending the standard view in the face of such examples. They 
will be introduced, and discussed, in sections 4 to 6. 
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2.2 Spelling out the proposal 
 
When I say that ‗rain‘ is a zero-place predicate, I do not mean to rule out  a Davidsonian 
analysis, that is, an analysis according to which ‗action verbs‘ (as Davidson calls them) take 
an extra event argument in addition to their ‗standard‘ arguments. What I mean, rather, is that 
meteorological verbs take no other argument than the event argument. And by this I do not 
mean that the standard arguments of the verb are not really arguments but are introduced 
indirectly in logical form via their relations to the event argument (the only argument the verb 
really takes). This is the ‗neo-Davidsonian‘ analysis, according to which a sentence like 
‗Mary dances‘ — which I will pretend to be tenseless6 — has the following logical form : 
 
e [DANCING (e)  AGENT (Mary, e)] 
 
Here, the agent, Mary, is introduced indirectly, as bearing the relation ‗AGENT‘ to the event e 
of dancing which is the only direct argument of ‗dance‘ (i.e. the only argument of the 
predicate ‗DANCE‘ which the verb ‗dance‘ contributes to logical form). I will myself use the 
neo-Davidsonian framework in what follows, but when I say that ‗rain‘ is a zero-place 
predicate, what I mean is not that it has no other direct argument than the event argument, 
since that it the case for all action verbs on the neo-Davidsonian analysis. What I mean, 
rather, is that it is has no ‘standard’ argument in the first place. In contrast to ‗dance‘, which 
has a standard agent argument (introduced indirectly in logical form, as in the above 
representation), ‗rain‘ has no agent or theme – the pronoun ‗it‘ is a dummy subject, with a 
syntactic role but no semantic contribution (Tesnière 1959 : 239-40).
7
 ‗Rain‘ is zero-place, 
                                                 
6
 Issues pertaining to tense and aspect will be kept aside in this paper, unless they have a 
direct bearing on the discussion. So, for example, I will systematically ignore the semantic 
contribution of the progressive in ‗It is raining‘ (and I will often ignore the contribution of the 
present tense). Of course, a really thorough effort to investigate the semantics of weather 
sentences would have to take both tense and aspect into account, but my ambition in this 
paper is deliberately limited. 
7
 There are special uses of ‗rain‘ where it takes a thematic complement, as in ‗It rains cats and 
dogs‘ (or ‗it rains frogs‘). I am not concerned with those uses here – even though I will 
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while intransitive verbs like ‗dance‘ are one-place, transitive verbs like ‗kiss‘ are two-place, 
and ditransitive verbs like ‗give‘ are three-place. 
 Since ‗rain‘ has zero argument, on my account, it does not have a location argument. 
That is not to deny that some verbs have a location argument. ‗Arrive‘ is a case in point. The 
logical form of (tenseless) ‗John arrives‘ is something like 
 
e [ARRIVING (e)  AGENT (John, e)  LOCATION (l, e)] 
 
The location of an arrival event is the goal location — the destination — of the motion which 
culminates in that event. That location need not be overtly specified, but at least it must be 
contextually understood. Thus, in the following dialogue, A‘s second statement is 
infelicitous : 
 
(11) A : John has arrived. 
B : Where has he arrived ? 
A : *I have no idea. 
 
This is the basic test I use for determining whether there is an argument slot in the lexical 
semantics of a verb : if there is one, the slot has to be filled, whether explicitly or 
contextually. (In the above logical form, the slot is represented by the free variable l, to which 
a value must be contextually assigned.) 
In contrast to ‗arrive‘, which carries an argument slot for a location, ‗dance‘ does not, as 
the following dialogue shows : 
 
(12) A : John has danced. 
B : Where has he danced ? 
A : I have no idea. 
 
The location of the dancing event need not be specified, explicitly or even contextually. So 
‗dance‘ does not carry an argument slot for a location. When the location of the dancing event 
is explicitly provided, it has the status of ‗adjunct‘, since it is semantically optional. 
                                                                                                                                                        
occasionally mention them as examples when the status of the complement is not what is at 
issue. 
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As I learnt from a referee, this way of drawing the distinction between arguments and 
adjuncts is due to the Prague school, and specifically to Jarmila Panevova (see Sgall et al. 
1986).
8
 I have myself put forward a similar test (which I call the ‗Optionality Criterion‘) in 
order to distinguish between the contextual provision of an implicit argument and the 
pragmatic process of ‗free enrichment‘. Free enrichment as I construe it is a pragmatic 
process through which the actual interpretation of an utterance is made contextually more 
specific than the literal meaning of the uttered sentence. While indexical resolution or the 
assignment of contextual values to free variables is a ‗bottom up‘ process mandated by the 
linguistic material, free enrichment is a ‗top-down‘ process which is not mandated by the 
linguistic material — it is not mandatory, from a linguistic point of view — but takes place 
for purely pragmatic reasons, that is, in order to make sense of what the speaker is saying. The 
speaker utters a sentence which has a certain meaning, but, owing to free enrichment, the 
utterance is understood (and expected to be understood) in a more specific sense than what its 
literal meaning licenses. The gap  between sentence meaning and utterance meaning is 
bridged by world knowledge and contextual expectations. For example, ‗rabbit‘ in ‗Mary 
likes to wear rabbit‘ is understood in the (specific) sense of rabbit fur, even though ‗rabbit‘ 
qua mass term literally means something more general like rabbit stuff. The reason why 
‗rabbit‘ in ‗Mary likes to wear rabbit‘ is interpreted differently than it is in e.g. ‗Mary likes to 
eat rabbit‘ is a matter of world knowledge and contextual expectations. We know that people 
eat rabbit meat, while they use rabbit fur for their clothes, and we expect the speaker to say 
plausible things.
 9
 
The hallmark of the pragmatic process of free enrichment, on my account, is that it is 
optional : it may or may not take place, depending on the context. Nothing prevents ‗rabbit‘, 
qua mass term, from being interpreted in the general sense rabbit stuff (‗After the accident, 
there was rabbit all over the highway‘). Still, in many contexts, it will be interpreted more 
specifically owing to free enrichment. Similarly for ‗dance‘ : as (12) shows, a ‗dance‘-
                                                 
8
 Actually Panenova‘s classification is complex and relies on a double distinction : beetween 
free adverbials/modifiers and inner participants, and, within the class of modifiers, between 
those that are ‗valency members‘ (a feature which makes them similar to inner participants) 
and those that are not. Valency members themselves may be obligatory or optional with a 
particular lexical item. See Panevova 2003. 
9
 The ‗rabbit‘ example is discussed by Nunberg and Zaenen (1992) who borrow it from 
Copestake and Briscoe (1992). 
  10 
statement may be understood in a location-indefinite manner. Still, a location for the event 
may also be contextually provided as part of the interpretation of the utterance, as in (13) : 
 
(13) A : Was John present at the ball ? 
B : Yes. He danced all night. 
 
Here B‘s statement ‗He danced all night‘ means that John danced all night at the ball. The 
contrast between (12) and (13) shows that the contextual specification of the location of the 
dancing event is optional, and this feature distinguishes that specification in (13) from the 
contextual provision of an implicit argument. The contextual provision of an implicit 
argument is a mandatory process, since it is required in virtue of the semantics of some 
expression in the sentence. 
Armed with these distinctions, let us return to ‗rain‘ and meteorological predicates. It 
seems that ‗rain‘ patterns with ‗arrive‘ and involves a location argument. If someone tells me 
‗It‘s raining‘ and I ask ‗Where ?‘, it would be infelicitous for my conversational partner to 
reply ‗I have no idea‘. This is the intuitive basis for the standard view regarding ‗rain‘ and 
meteorological predicates. But the situation is not as simple as that. In the weatherman 
scenario, we can have the following dialogue : 
 
(14) A (the weatherman) : It is raining ! 
B : Where ? 
A : I have no idea — let‘s check. 
 
I precisely constructed the weatherman example in order to show that, appearances 
notwithstanding, the contextually specified location is not a genuine implicit argument in the 
‗rain‘ case. It is not a genuine implicit argument because, if it were, it would have to be 
provided in every context, including the context of the weatherman example (where no 
location is actually specified). In Recanati 2002 I used the weatherman example to argue that 
the location of rain, when contextually specified, is specified through a process of pragmatic 
enrichment ; a process that may take place in connection with any event predicate 
whatsoever, including ‗dance‘ (as in [13]), and which casts no distinctive light on the 
semantics of meteorological predicates as opposed to other event predicates. 
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2.3 An objection : ‘rain’ vs ‘dance’ 
 
One may object that there is a difference between ‗rain‘ and ‗dance‘ as far as locations are 
concerned. With ‗dance‘, it‘s easy to come up with examples in which the location does not 
matter and is left unspecified. No so with ‗rain‘ : it takes work to construct an example like 
the weatherman example.
 10
 This difference must be accounted for. 
I agree. Still, I maintain, the sheer possibility of the weatherman example shows that 
the provision of a location for the raining event is not mandatory (semantically triggered), but 
optional (pragmatically triggered). If that is right, then the difference between ‗rain‘ and 
‗dance‘ will itself have to be explained on a pragmatic basis. Such an explanation can proceed 
along the following lines : in general, we care about meteorological events to the extent that 
we care about the locations where they take place. The existence of a raining event per se (as 
opposed to the existence of a raining event at such and such a place) is hardly of sufficient 
interest to be worth mentioning. The same thing does not hold for the other types of event. It 
may be interesting to hear that John kissed Mary even though we are not told where that event 
happened. 
To check that this explanation is correct, we only have to imagine a meteorological 
event likely to arouse one‘s interest quite independent of its location. The pragmatic account I 
favour predicts that a statement describing such an event would not necessarily be understood 
as location-specific. The following is an example : 
 
(15) Once, in Antiquity, it rained blood. Since then, no such thing ever happened again. 
 
The prediction seems to be borne out : in (15), the statement ‗it rained blood‘ is understood in 
a location-indefinite manner. Compare this with an ‗ordinary‘ type of example like (16) : 
 
(16) Yesterday, it rained. 
 
                                                 
10
 The fact that it takes work to construct the weatherman example suggests that, by investing 
as much work in the construction of weird scenarios, one might perhaps come up with 
examples in which predicates which (according to me) do carry a covert argument are 
nevertheless given an indefinite reading. See §6.2 for a discussion of this objection. 
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In contrast to (15), (16) will — typically — be interpreted in a location-specific manner. But 
this contrast can be manipulated by manipulating the context, as I did in constructing the 
weatherman example. All this suggests that whatever implicit location-specificity we find in 
‗rain‘-statements is due to pragmatic factors. 
 
3. Four levels of analysis 
 
3.1. The metaphysical level 
 
According to my proposal, the sentence ‗It is raining‘ means something very simple and very 
close to the surface : that a rain event is occurring. No place is mentioned by the sentence as 
the place where that event occurs. Of course there must be such a place : an event can only 
occur at a particular place (and a particular time). This is a metaphysical fact about events, 
which holds whether the event is a raining event or a dancing event or a kissing event. Those 
event-types differ in many respects, and one of these differences is reflected in the difference 
between the argument structures of the corresponding predicates : ‗rain‘ is a zero-place 
predicate, ‗dance‘ is a one-place predicate, and ‗kiss‘ is a two-place predicate. The place and 
time of the described event do not automatically count as arguments of the predicate, hence 
they are not automatically part of the argument structure, because they are general 
characteristics of events.
11
 As such, they do not differentiate events from one another. (Again, 
that is not to deny that some verbs, like ‗arrive‘ or ‗last‘, carry a temporal or locational 
argument. They are distinguished from verbs like ‗dance‘ by the fact that the time or place of 
the described event must be specified, explicitly or contextually.) 
One may object that we need to posit a location argument in the logical form of ‗It is 
raining‘ even if we focus on location-indefinite uses of the sentence, such as the weatherman 
example. Stephen Neale says so in his article ‗On Location‘, where he objects to my proposal. 
I claim that the weatherman‘s utterance of ‗It is raining‘ is true if and only if it is raining 
somewhere (at the time of utterance). Now the proposition that it is raining somewhere is a 
general proposition, Neale points out — something we can get from a singular proposition 
(e.g. ‗It‘s raining in Paris‘) by existential generalization, just as we can get from ‗François 
sneezed‘ to ‗Someone sneezed‘ by existential generalization. And just as the general 
proposition that someone sneezed, representable as (18) in a structured-propositions 
                                                 
11
 I am indebted to Dick Carter for emphasizing this distinction. 
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framework, contains the same number of constituents as (17) (the singular proposition that 
François sneezed), similarly the proposition that it‘s raining somewhere, arguably expressed 
by the weatherman‘s utterance, has the same number of constituents as the proposition that 
it‘s raining at such and such a place. In particular, as (19) and (20) show, there is a ‗location‘ 
constituent in both cases : a singular location constituent in one case (‗It‘s raining in Paris‘), a 
general location constituent in the other case (‗It‘s raining somewhere‘). 
 
(17) <FRANÇOIS, SNEEZED> 
(18) <<SOME, PERSON>, SNEEZED> 
(19) <PARIS, RAINING> 
(20) <<SOME, LOCATION>, RAINING> 
 
If, as I suggest, we get rid of the location constituent and take the proposition expressed by 
the weatherman‘s utterance to be the proposition that it is raining punkt, then we no longer 
have a complete, truth evaluable proposition as the content of that utterance. Is the proposition 
that it‘s raining (now) punkt true or false ? According to Neale, this question cannot be 
answered: 
 
The reason we don‘t answer ‗true‘ or ‗false‘ is that the only way we can construe the 
question as worthy of one of these answers is if we construe it not as a punkt question 
at all, but as a question about the proposition that it is raining somewhere in particular, 
or as a question about the proposition that it is raining somewhere or other… The 
question whether it is raining (now) punkt has no answer because it is not a genuine 
question.  (Neale forthcoming). 
 
 Neale obviously thinks I have conflated two things — the general proposition that it‘s 
raining somewhere or other, and the proposition (or quasi-proposition) that it‘s raining punkt. 
But I have not : I take these propositions to be distinct, and it is the latter, not the former, 
which I take to be the semantic content of the weatherman‘s utterance. These propositions are 
distinct, yet truth-conditionally equivalent. The proposition that it is raining punkt is true if 
and only if it is raining somewhere. It follows that the question whether it‘s raining (punkt) 
has an answer, provided the question whether it‘s raining somewhere itself has an answer. 
What makes the two propositions equivalent is the fact that (i) from the general 
proposition that it is raining somewhere we can infer the proposition that it is raining  punkt, 
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and (ii) from the proposition that it is raining punkt we can infer the general proposition that it 
is raining somewhere. The first inference is pretty obviously valid, and we can account for it 
in Davidsonian terms : we can infer ‗It is raining‘ from ‗It is raining somewhere‘ because 
(leaving tense and aspect aside) ‗It is raining somewhere‘ can be analysed as 
 
e l [RAINING (e)  LOCATION (l, e)] 
 
which entails the proposition that it is raining punkt, analysed as 
 
e [RAINING (e)]. 
 
Inference (ii) is where Neale sees a problem : how can we get from ‗It‘s raining‘ to 
‗It‘s raining somewhere‘ ? Actually I find this step as easy as the first one. What licences the 
step from the punkt proposition to the existential proposition is the metaphysical fact that
 
every event takes place somewhere. Since every event takes place somewhere, we can infer 
‗It is raining somewhere‘ from ‗It is raining‘, even though ‗It is raining‘ says nothing about 
places but merely conveys the proposition that a rain event is occurring. The place is taken 
care of by the metaphysics, and does not have to figure in the semantics.
12
 
Note that what Neale says about ‗rain‘ would apply do ‗dance‘ as well, or to any other 
action verb. If « the question whether it is raining (now) punkt has no answer because it is not 
a genuine question », what about the question whether Mary is dancing (now) punkt? Is this a 
genuine question ? As in the other case, we can make sense of the question only if we 
interpret it as asking whether Mary is dancing at some particular place, or as asking whether 
she is dancing in some place or other. Does it follow that the relation expressed by ‗dance‘ 
involves an argument role for a location ? No, because, again, the location is taken care of by 
                                                 
12
 The same reasoning applies to the inference from ‗Sue is a good dancer‘ to ‗There is a way 
in which Sue is good‘. Zoltan Szabo argue that, to account for this inference, we need to posit 
a variable ‗R’ for a ‗way of being good‘ in the logical form of ‗Sue is a good dancer‘ (Szabo 
2001 §4). But we don‘t need such a variable in logical form, at least if we take ‗logical form‘ 
in the syntactic sense. The alleged ‗way of being good‘ is — presumably — taken care of by 
the metaphysics of goodness and does not have to figure in the semantics. See Cappelen and 
Lepore 2005 (and Borg 2004) for related points about the semantics/metaphysics distinction, 
which they unfortunately overuse. 
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the metaphysics. Every event takes place somewhere : that is the reason why we can infer 
‗Mary danced somewhere‘ from ‗Mary danced‘, even though ‗Mary danced‘ says nothing 
about places. Strawson made that point forcefully ten years ago. He wrote : 
 
Our grasp of the fact that these quantifiers [e.g. ‗somewhere‘] can be added to (…) 
simple ascriptions of human actions without modification of truth-value rests on 
nothing more recondite than our grasp of the general concept of action. (Strawson 
1997 : 75) 
 
Like Davidson, Strawson speaks of ‗actions‘. But I think the point extends to events in 
general. The ‗general concept‘ of an event is the concept of something that happens, and 
whathever happens happens at a place and a time. There may be difficulties in identifying the 
time or place of an event if the time or place in question happens to be complex or 
disconnected. What is the exact time and place for the event of circumnavigating the globe ? 
Is this really an event ? Is a collection of events an event ? What about the French 
Revolution ? All sorts of questions arise in this area, but I will not pause to consider them, as 
they are irrelevant to the main issue at stake. There may also be more problematic cases in 
which we use action verbs to talk about things that are not really events and therefore do not 
satisfy the metaphysical constraints on events. In such a case event talk is a mere façon de 
parler : we talk of some things that are not events as if they were events, and those things, 
insofar as they are not genuine events, need not have a time or a location coordinate. I will 
leave that issue aside because I take it as obvious that meteorological events are genuine 
events.
13
 
                                                 
13
 One last issue worth considering is the distinction between events and states within 
the overall category of eventualities. I said that the possession of spatio-temporal location is a 
general characteristic of events, rather than a distinctive property that some events have and 
others lack ; and that was one of the reasons for not considering the location as automatically 
part of the argument structure of event verbs. But what is true of events is not true of states. 
States need not be located in the sense in which events need to be located. So if we work with 
a unified category of eventuality (as some people do, who use the variable ‗e‘ as an 
eventuality variable rather than specifically as an event variable) then we may have a reason 
for introducing locations in the logical form of event sentences. A verb v denoting an event of 
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3.2 The pragmatic level 
 
In a case like ‗dance‘, the location of the event may be contextually understood even though 
this is not imposed by the argument structure of the verb. That happens whenever the location 
of the event is so relevant to the conversational purposes at hand that it cannot be left out of 
the picture. Thus in (13) the conversational partners are talking about the ball, and in that 
context B‘s utterance of ‗He danced all night‘ is naturally understood as saying that John 
danced all night at the ball. This is free enrichment : there is no linguistic reference to the 
ball, whether overt or covert, in the sentence ‗He danced all night‘, yet the speaker tacitly 
refers to the ball (and is understood as so referring).
14
 
The pragmatic enrichment resulting from the tacit reference to a location can be 
represented as the contextual provision of an extra conjunct, e.g.  LOCATION (the-ball, e), in 
                                                                                                                                                        
type  will be distinguished from a verb v’ denoting a state of type  by the fact that the 
verb‘s contribution is bound to be a located eventuality only in the former case : 
 
[[v]] = e [t l [TIME (t, e)  LOCATION (l, e)  e]] 
[[v‘]] = e [e] 
 
In that sort of framework, we could still represent the difference between event-verbs which, 
like ‗arrive‘ or ‗leave‘, do carry an argument slot for a location, and those which do not. For 
those which do carry an argument slot, we would simply add a conjunct ‗l = y‘, where ‗y‘ is a 
free variable to which a value must be contextually assigned (unless it is bound higher up in 
the sentence). Thus the lexical entry for ‗arrive‘ would be : 
 
 x y e [t  l [TIME (t, e)  LOCATION (l, e)  ARRIVING (e)  AGENT (x, e)  l = y]] 
 
In this paper, however, I assume that ‗e‘ is specifically an event variable, so the introduction 
of times and places in the logical form of event sentences is not necessary (unless they are 
contributed at some other level than the metaphysical level). 
14
 See Gardent (2005) for a formal analysis of this type of enrichment in terms of a general 
‗principle of minimality‘. 
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the scope of the event quantifier.
15
 Thus enriched, the logical form of ‗He danced all night‘ is 
something like
16
 
 
(21) e t [PAST (t)  TIME  (t, e)  DANCING (e)  AGENT (John, e)  ALL-NIGHT (e)  
LOCATION (the-ball, e)] 
 
More pragmatic enrichment is perhaps needed to account for the fact that the past tense here 
is understood deictically, as referring to a specific period of time.
17
 
The following example of free enrichment, due to Robyn Carston (1988), can be handled 
similarly through the addition of an extra conjunct about location : 
 
(22) John went to Austria and (he) ran into Hans 
 
In (22), the event of running into Hans is understood has having taken place in Austria, since 
John‘s move to Austria has just been mentioned. Simplifying somewhat, the literal meaning 
of  (22) can be represented as follows : 
 
(23) e t [PAST (t)  TIME (t, e)  GOING (e)  AGENT (John, e)  TO (Austria, e)]  e’ t’ 
[PAST (t’)  TIME (t’, e’)  ENCOUNTERING (e’)  SUBJ (John, e’)  OBJ (Hans, e’)] 
 
That is, there is a past event e which is a travel by John to Austria, and there is a past event e’ 
which is an encountering of Hans by John. (I gloss over subtle distinctions having to do with 
the exact roles played by John and Hans in the encountering event — hence the use of ‗SUBJ‘ 
and ‗OBJ‘ instead of ‗AGENT‘, ‗EXPERIENCER‘ or ‗THEME‘). 
Through free enrichment, two extra pieces of information concerning the time and 
location of e‘ are built into the logical form. First, it is contextually understood that John ran 
                                                 
15
 An alternative analysis in terms of quantifier domain restriction will be discussed in § 6.1. 
16
 Here as elsewhere in this paper, I disregard the contribution of the perfective (resp. 
imperfective) aspect. It could be represented by using Parsons‘ ‗CUL‘ and ‗HOLD‘ predicates 
and substituting ‗CUL (e, t)‘ or ‗HOLD (e, t)‘ for the aspectually neutral ‗TIME (t, e)‘ in the 
logical forms. 
17
 Thus we could add an extra conjunct ‗t = x‘, as suggested in footnote 13 for a different type 
of case. 
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into Hans after going to Austria. More precisely, e, qua telic event, involves a transition to a 
new state (here, the state s of John‘s being in Austria), and the time t’ of John‘s running into 
Hans is understood as included in the time span of s. I will represent this piece of information 
by means of an extra conjunct  (t’, e) (where ‗‘ stands for the relation ‗is included in the 
time span of the state brought about by‘). Second, e’ is understood as taking place in Austria, 
that is, in the location where John finds himself as a result of e. This second piece of 
information built into the logical form through free enrichment can also be represented by 
means of another extra conjunct, LOCATION (Austria, e’). The modified logical form we get 
is therefore : 
 
(24) e t [PAST (t)  TIME (t, e)  GOING (e)  AGENT (John, e)  TO (Austria, e)  e’ t’ 
[PAST (t’)  TIME (t’, e’)  ENCOUNTERING (e’)  SUBJ (John, e’)  OBJ (Hans, e’)   
(t’, e)  LOCATION (e‘, Austria)]] 
 
Just as I have done for (13) and (22), I distinguish the bare logical form of a statement 
like ‗It is raining‘, viz. (25) below, from its modified logical form (26) :18 
 
(25) e t [PRESENT (t)  TIME (t, e)  RAINING (e)] 
(26) e t [PRESENT (t)  TIME (t, e)  RAINING (e)  LOCATION (Paris, e)] 
 
What is responsible for the difference between the bare logical form (25) and the modified 
logical form (26) is free enrichment. Since free enrichment is optional and context-driven, 
there will be contexts in which no modification will be introduced and the intuitive truth-
conditions of ‗It is raining‘ will be determined by its bare logical form. The weatherman 
context is arguably one such context.
19
 
 
                                                 
18
 The distinction between bare logical form and modified logical form will be elaborated in 
section 7. 
19
 This is actually debatable. If, as several commentators have pointed out, rain in Mars would 
be irrelevant to the truth of the weatherman utterance, this suggests that some form of 
enrichment takes place in this example as well. 
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3.3 The lexical level and the phrasal/ sentential level 
 
Note that, in the part of (23) that represents the bare logical form of the second clause of (22), 
we find information about the time of the encountering event e’. Information about the 
location of e’ only comes into the picture through pragmatic enrichment, but temporal 
information is already present at the literal level. Indeed, as one referee pointed out, the time 
is treated very much like the agent. Both are introduced into the logical form via their 
relations to the event argument. Does this not contradict what I have just said about the time 
not being an argument, contrary to e.g. the agent ? 
 It doesn‘t, because the time is introduced into the logical form through the semantic 
contribution of the past tense. It is not introduced through the contribution of the verb itself. 
While some verbs, like ‗last‘, have a temporal argument, others like ‗dance‘ or ‗run into‘ do 
not. Indeed the lexical entry of most verbs is both temporally and locationally neutral. The 
difference between time and location comes about at the level of finite clauses : temporal 
information is contributed by the tenses, so there is a temporal argument in the resulting 
logical form, before enrichment. In contrast, a locative argument is introduced into the logical 
form of a statement like (13) only through free enrichment ; it does not belong to the literal 
meaning of the sentence. 
 I conclude that we should distinguish four levels : the metaphysical level, the lexical 
level, the syntagmatic (i.e. phrasal and/or sentential) level, and the pragmatic level. There is 
no temporal or locative argument in the lexical entry for a verb like ‗dance‘ (in contrast to 
verbs like ‗arrive‘ or ‗last‘, which take a locative and temporal argument respectively). Still, 
such verbs denote events, and an event has both a time and a location coordinate at the 
metaphysical level. Furthermore, times are introduced into the logical form at the sentential 
level via the tense of the verb : this distinguishes times from locations, since there is no 
counterpart to tense in the spatial domain. Locations can be optionally introduced into the 
(bare) logical form at the syntagmatic level by means of locative phrases, or they can be 
introduced into the (modified) logical form at the pragmatic level, via free enrichment. 
 Returning to my main point : I hold that ‗rain‘ is like ‗dance‘. There is no location 
argument in the lexical entry for the verb ‗rain‘, which can be represented simply as 
 
e [RAINING (e)] 
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Metaphysically, however, there‘s bound to be a location for the event, and pragmatically also, 
a location is most of the time contextually understood if not explicitly specified. The reason, 
again, is that we care about meteorological events to the extent that we care about their 
locations. I may be interested in hearing that it rains frogs or that it rains blood, in whichever 
place that happens ; but for ordinary rain or snow, I‘m interested in hearing about it only if it 
concerns some place that I‘m interested in. Hence a location-indefinite ‗It‘s raining‘ is 
unlikely (unless we devise a special context, like the weatherman scenario). 
 
4. Reinterpreting the weatherman example 
 
4.1 Summing up 
 
Even though the reference to the ball is linguistically unarticulated in example (13), it affects 
the intuitive truth-conditional content of the utterance. That is why I talk of ‗pragmatic 
enrichment‘ rather than of ‗conversational implicature‘, since the notion of implicature is 
often taken in a narrow sense which entails truth-conditional irrelevance. Yet pragmatic 
enrichment has something important in common with conversational implicature : in both 
cases the aspects of meaning that result from the pragmatic process are optional. Nothing in 
the sentence itself — nothing linguistic — requires the pragmatic enrichment to take place ; 
hence it may or may not take place, depending on the context. In this respect pragmatic 
enrichment differs from indexical resolution and from the assignment of values to free 
variables/pronominal elements. When a value is contextually assigned to an indexical or a 
free variable in logical form, the contextual process of value assignment is triggered by 
something linguistic. Since it originates in some property of the expression type, the 
pragmatic process in question must take place, that is, it takes place in every context in which 
the sentence is felicitously uttered. This provides us with a test for deciding whether a 
contextually provided element of utterance meaning results from pragmatic enrichment, or 
whether it results from ‗saturation‘, i.e. from a mandatory process of contextual assignment. 
 In the case of ‗rain‘, we find that the contextual specification of the place of rain 
results from free enrichment, rather than from saturation (as the standard view has it), because 
it is not mandatory. In the weatherman example, no place of rain is specified. This shows that 
meteorological predicates do not carry an argument slot for a location, contrary to the 
standard view. They no more carry an argument slot for a location than event predicates like 
‗dance‘ do. In all cases, a process of free enrichment may take place, in virtue of which the 
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speaker tacitly refers to a particular place as the place of the described event, but this process 
is entirely pragmatic and is therefore irrelevant to the semantics of the event predicate. 
 I take the weatherman example to cast doubt on the standard view. Since I published 
it, however, attempts have been made to account for it without departing from the latter. Two 
ways of reinterpreting the weatherman example have been suggested so as to avoid my 
conclusion that the location of rain is not linguistically represented in sentences like (2).
20
  
According to the first reinterpretation, the weatherman example is compatible with the claim 
that ‗rain‘ is associated with a free location variable (or is a part-time indexical whose content 
depends upon a contextually provided location) because, appearances notwisthstanding, a 
specific location is contextually provided even in that example. The second reinterpretation 
concedes that the location of rain is not specified in the weatherman example, but rejects the 
conclusion that it is not linguistically represented. Rather, it holds that there is implicit 
existential quantification of the location variable. 
 
4.2 Rain on Earth 
 
The first re-interpretation has been put forward by Luisa Marti (2004) and, independently, by 
Paul Elbourne (p.c.). They argue that, in the weatherman example, the location variable is 
assigned the whole territory as contextual value. ‗It‘s raining‘ therefore means something like 
‗It‘s raining on Earth‘. 21 
                                                 
20
 Actually, four ways of reinterpreting the weatherman example have been suggested. The 
third reinterpretation appeals to a pragmatic account of the data that is significantly different 
from the account I have sketched ; I defer discussion of that alternative account until § 6.2. 
The fourth reinterpretation, due to Andrea Iacona, invokes a distinction between 
epistemological content and semantic content which I am unwilling to accept. I will not 
discuss Iacona‘s solution in this paper, but refer the interested reader to his article (Iacona 
2005). 
21
 Elbourne says he does not actually hold the view, but merely puts it forward for 
consideration. Besides Marti and Elbourne, other persons have argued along the same lines. 
The first to have done so in print are Sandro Capone and Jason Stanley in their respective 
reviews of my Literal Meaning (Capone 2005 : 46, Stanley 2005b). Stephen Neale 
(forthcoming) defends a similar position but, like Perry, he refrains from positing an 
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 Whoever puts forward such a proposal  must explain why we get an existential 
reading : ‗It is raining (somewhere) on Earth‘. Normally, when we say e.g. ‗It‘s raining in 
Paris‘, we mean something nearly universal : that it is raining over Paris (i.e. at most sub-
locations in the Paris area). But clearly, in the weatherman example, the sentence ‗It‘s 
raining‘ does not mean that it‘s raining over the Earth (i.e., nearly everywhere). The 
weatherman‘s utterance only means that it‘s raining somewhere. 
 It is not hard to find an explanation for this fact, however. One may argue that the 
universal reading, though widespread and possibly standard, is not linguistically mandated but 
itself results from a pragmatic process — a pragmatic process that does not take place,  for 
principled reasons, in the weatherman example. The explanation proceeds roughly as follows. 
 
1. The sentence ‗it rains at l‘ is literally true if and only if it rains at some sub-location l’ 
of l. 
2. In many cases, it is relevant to mention rain in connection with a specific place l only 
if the sub-locations of l where rain actually occurs are representative of l. 
3. If it rains over l, then rain occurs at most sub-locations of l, and this is sufficient to 
guarantee representativity. 
4. The hearer assumes (and is expected to assume) that the utterance is relevant, hence in 
many cases he or she will be led to assume that it rains over l. 
5. In some cases, however, one of the following conditions may be satisfied : it is 
relevant to mention rain in connection with some location l even if the sub-locations of 
l where rain actually occurs are not representative of l, or the sub-locations in question 
are representative of l even if it does not rain over l. If either of these conditions is 
satisfied it will be relevant to mention rain in connection with place l even though it 
does not rain over l. For example, if I am told that ‗it‘s raining frogs in Boston‘, I do 
not (necessarily) conclude that it‘s raining frogs in most spots of the Boston area. It is 
relevant enough to know that in some spot in the Boston area, it‘s raining frogs. 22 
                                                                                                                                                        
‗argument place‘ or a free variable in logical form and commits himself only to the existence 
of an ‗argument role‘ in the lexical semantics of ‗rain‘ and other meteorological predicates. 
22
 I owe the ‗raining frog‘ example to Dan Sperber. (The same example has independently 
come up in discussions between Pranav Anand, Eric Swanson and Sarah Moss at MIT.) 
Which of the two defeating conditions obtains in such a case is an issue I will not go into 
here. 
  23 
6. In the weatherman example, arguably, one of the defeating conditions is satisfied, just 
as in the raining frog example. For that reason, the pragmatic step from existential to 
universal is not taken. 
 
 According to the proposed explanation, the existential (nonspecific) reading of the 
weatherman example is compatible with the fact that a specific location is contextually 
provided ; for the specific location in question — the Earth — is the place of rain only in the 
sense that it includes (as a sub-location) the place of rain. It turns out that there are two senses 
for the phrase ‗the place of rain‘ : in the narrow sense, the place of rain is the place which rain 
actually fills ; in the broad sense, the place of rain can be any place that includes the narrow-
place-of-rain as a sub-location. If it rains in some place (in the narrow sense) then (in the 
broad sense) it rains in any place including it. If it rains in Mexico City (or in some suburb of 
Mexico City), then it rains on Earth. The weaterman example is nonspecific (existential) with 
respect to the narrow place of rain, but it nevertheless contextually specifies the place of rain 
in the broad sense. 
 On this view the lexical entry for the verb ‗rain‘ is something like 
 
l  e [RAINING (e)  LOCATIONB (l, e)] 
 
and, as the subscript indicates, the location relation itself is understood in the broad sense and 
analysed as follows : 
 
(e) (l) [LOCATIONB (l, e) iff l’ (LOCATION (l’, e)  l’  l)] 
 
where ‗<‘ is the sub-location relation and ‗LOCATION‘ corresponds to the ordinary, narrow 
notion of location. In the weatherman example, the variable ‗l’ is assigned the Earth as value, 
and the event variable is existentially quantified, so that (disregarding tense and aspect once 
again) we get the expected reading : 
 
e [RAINING (e)  LOCATIONB (the Earth, e)] 
 
that is, 
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 e l’ [RAINING (e)  LOCATION (l’, e)  l’  the Earth] 
 
4.3 Optional variables 
 
The second reinterpretation appeals to the fact that, as the Partee examples show, an implicit 
variable can be bound. Since that is so, why not say that the implicit location variable is 
bound by an existentially quantifier in the weatherman example, thus giving rise to the 
indefinite reading ? Why not analyse ‗It‘s raining‘, in that example, as ‗There is a location l 
such that it‘s raining at l‘ ? Or, equivalently, why not say that the argument-slot for a location 
is filled by means of a covert indefinite (‗somewhere‘)? 
 The reason I have offered for resisting this sort of analysis is that overt variables (e.g. 
pronouns) cannot be covertly bound. Thus, as I pointed out, ‗He is tall‘ cannot mean that 
someone or other is tall. Why should covert variables behave differently from overt 
variables ? 
 After presenting this argument in ‗Unarticulated Constituents‘, I anticipated a possible 
response. There are, one might argue, two sorts of variables : those which (like pronouns) 
must be contextually assigned a value when unbound, and those which, when unbound, can 
either be contextually assigned a value or undergo existential closure. The variables which 
need not be assigned a specific value but may undergo existential closure I dubbed ‗optional 
variables‘. To account for the weatherman example, then, one only has to claim that the 
location variable belongs to the ‗optional‘ category. 
 This response will be convincing only if the category of optional variables is 
independently needed, that is, only if we can find clear instances of the category. It is 
tempting to argue at this point that relational nouns like ‗mother‘ precisely carry such an 
optional variable ; a variable which, as examples (7) and (8) demonstrate, can be either bound 
by a covert existential quantifier or assigned a definite value. Yet we cannot so argue without 
begging the question, for what is at stake is the correct analysis of sentences in which a 
putative implicit argument is understood as existentially quantified. To justify the analysis in 
terms of optional variables both of examples like (7)-(8) and of the weatherman example, we 
must find instances of optional variables among the overt variable-like elements. 
 The only candidate I can think of here is tense. According to Partee (1973), there is a 
striking parallel between tenses and pronouns, a parallel that justifies treating tenses as 
variables. Like pronouns, tenses have deictic, anaphoric and bound uses. In Partee‘s famous 
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example, ‗I did not turn off the stove‘, the past tense is understood deictically : the speaker 
refers to a specific time in the past. As Partee writes, 
 
When uttered, for instance, halfway down the turnpike, such a sentence clearly does 
not mean either that there exists some time in the past at which I did not turn off the 
stove or that there exists no time in the past at which I turned off the stove. The 
sentence clearly refers to a particular time. (Partee 1973/2004 : 51) 
 
Partee provides other examples in which tenses are used anaphorically or as bound variables. 
But what she fails to notice in her paper is that tenses have a reading which pronouns do not 
have. 
 The extra reading I have in mind is the very reading which Partee says is unlikely in 
the context she describes. In a different context, presumably, the past tense sentence ‗I did not 
turn off the stove‘ could be given an ‗indefinite‘ or ‗existential‘ interpretation, rather than a 
deictic interpretation. One week after the event reported by her utterance ‗I did not turn off 
the stove‘, Partee might have told the story as follows : ‗Last week, I did not turn off the stove 
and I risked a serious accident‘. In this sentence the simple past has an existential reading : the 
sentence says that there is an event e and a past time t such that e is my not-turning-off the 
stove at time t, which time t is located within the time-span indicated by the temporal 
adverbial ‗last week‘. Even though the sentence contains a reference to the time-span within 
which the event talked about is said to occur, there is no deictic reference to the time of the 
event itself, which remains indefinite.
23
  This is in contrast to Partee‘s original example, in 
which it seems that there is reference to the time of the described event. If that is right, and if 
Partee‘s analysis of tenses as variables is correct, then temporal variables may not only be 
assigned specific values, as in Partee‘s original example, but may also undergo existential 
closure, as in the revised version of the example. 
In the revised version of the Partee example, we need a temporal adverbial such as 
‗last week‘, referring to a period in the past, because without such a reference to the past we 
would have to use the present perfect to convey the existential interpretation. In French, 
things are simpler : without any temporal adverbial, the passé composé can be given either a 
deictic or an existential interpretation. The same thing is true of the future, both in French and 
in English. The sentence 
                                                 
23
 I am indebted to Philippe Schlenker for discussion of this type of example. 
  26 
 
I will go to China 
 
may be understood in two ways : either the speaker is referring to some specific future time, 
made salient in the context, and she says that she will go to China at that time, or  she is 
merely saying that there is a future time at which she will go to China. 
What matters to us is that the second, existential reading is not available with 
pronouns : ‗He is bald‘ cannot mean that some male or other is bald.24 Because of that extra 
reading, if tenses are to be treated as variables (as Partee 1973 suggests), the variables in 
question must be different from pronominal variables : they must be optional variables. An 
optional variable, when unbound, may be contextually assigned a specific value or undergo 
existential closure. 
 We can, however, reject Partee‘s entire approach and maintain that tensed sentences 
— or at least, the sentences in the simple past she uses as examples25 — quantify over times, 
even on the alleged deictic reading. The deictic reading arguably results from restricting the 
domain of quantification in a manner that mimics singular reference.
26
 Thus ‗I didn‘t turn off 
the stove‘ means that, in the set of past events immediately following my last use of the stove, 
there is no turning off of the stove by me. In this way we account for the coexistence of 
existential and of (alleged) deictic uses without having to posit optional variables. 
 Which theory are we to choose ? Everything being equal, we should prefer the most 
parsimonious theory, that is, the theory that does not posit optional variables (in addition to 
standard pronominal elements). But everything may not be equal. The analysis of tense is a 
complex affair, and Partee‘s type of  approach using variables is generally considered as quite 
                                                 
24
 Partee (1973/2004 : 52) mentions the existence of what she calls a ‗nonspecific‘ deictic use 
of tenses, as in ‗John went to a private school‘, and she claims that pronouns too have such a 
use (‗They haven‘t installed my telephone yet‘). So she might be tempted to deny the 
asymmetry that I am pointing out — she might argue that the alleged existential readings are 
all nonspecific deictic uses. 
25
 This qualification is needed in view of the fact that, as Schlenker pointed out to me, French 
‗imparfait‘ does not accept existential readings. 
26
 This alternative analysis was first mentioned by Partee herself (see footnote 3 in her 1973 
paper). See Lasersohn 1999 : 537 for a recent proposal along those lines. 
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successful ;
27
 it may be, therefore, that we shall have to swallow optional variables in the 
package. If so — if optional variables are independently needed to account for tense — then 
we may feel free to use them to account for the weatherman example. 
 If we take this line, the lexical entry for ‗rain‘ will be, again, 
 
l  e [RAINING (e)  LOCATION (l, e)] 
 
but this time the location relation will be understood in the standard, narrow sense (as the 
absence of subscript indicates). On this theory, what happens in the weatherman example is 
that the location variable l is bound by an existential quantifier, like the event variable, instead 
of being assigned a contextual value : 
 
e l  [RAINING (e)  LOCATION (l, e)] 
 
 
5. Who is right ? 
  
5.1 Summing up 
 
Three theories are in competition to account for the weatherman example. According to the 
first theory, meteorological predicates do not carry an argument slot for a location (except in 
the general sense in which every event predicate carries such a slot) ; it follows that 
meteorological sentences like ‗It is raining‘ need not be understood as location-specific. 
Putting tense and aspect aside, the semantic content of (2) is simply : 
 
e [RAINING (e)] 
                                                 
27
 Not by Partee herself, though. In Partee 1984b she gives up her earlier analysis and treats 
the tenses as establishing relations between event time and reference time (as in Wolfgang 
Klein‘s Reichenbachian framework). She not only gives up the treatment of tenses as 
variables, but also refrains from positing reference-time variables : the reference time, she 
points out, ‗does not correspond uniformly to any single constituent of the sentence‘ and it 
resists introduction in a direct model-theoretic interpretation of the syntax (Partee 1984b : 
266). 
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On this view the possibility of an indefinite reading of (2), as in the weatherman example, is 
entirely expected. (2) says that a rain event is taking place, and a rain event, like any event, is 
bound to take place somewhere. Hence ‗It‘s raining‘ is equivalent to ‗It‘s raining somewhere‘, 
just as ‗Mary is dancing‘ is equivalent to ‗Mary is dancing somewhere‘. 
 Both the second and the third theory maintain that meteorological predicates like ‗rain‘ 
carry an argument slot for a location : 
 
- According to the second theory, which is an instance of the standard view, the slot 
must be contextually filled with a specific location ; and a specific location is indeed 
provided in the weatherman example, namely the Earth. The existential force of the 
weatherman example is accounted for by interpreting the location relation in the broad 
sense. 
- According to the third theory, the argument slot need not be filled with a specific 
location ; it may be bound by a covert existential quantifier, and that is what happens 
in the weatherman example. 
  
 How are we to adjudicate between the three theories ? In this section, I argue that both 
the second and the third theory face problems. The third theory does not rule out a certain 
reading which, as a matter of fact, does not exist, or is hard to get ; while the second theory 
weakens the notion of location to the point where it can no longer do the job it was intended 
to do. 
 
5.2 Against the third theory 
 
Consider the sentence : 
 
(27) It is not raining 
 
Can we run (a variant of) the weatherman example with that sentence, so as to get the 
following reading : in some place or other, it’s not raining ? Let us try, by adjusting the 
original scenario : 
 
Imagine a situation in which the absence of rain has become extremely rare and 
  29 
important (it rains almost everywhere and everytime). All over the territory detectors 
have been disposed, which trigger an alarm bell in the Monitoring Room when they 
detect the absence of rain. There is a single bell ; the location of the triggering detector 
is indicated by a light on a board in the Monitoring Room. After weeks of flood, the 
bell eventually rings in the Monitoring Room. Hearing it, the weatherman on duty in 
the adjacent room shouts : ‗It‘s not raining !‘ 
 
Can we say that the weatherman‘s utterance is true iff, in some place or other, it is not raining 
(at the time of utterance) ? I find it rather hard to understand the utterance that way, despite 
the context. The weatherman ought to say something like ‗The rain has stopped‘ : this could 
be understood as meaning that the rain has stopped somewhere. But it is very hard to assign to 
‗It‘s not raining‘ the (wide scope) indefinite reading — much harder than it is to understand 
the positive sentence indefinitely, as in the original weatherman example. 
 The unavailability of the wide-scope indefinite reading of (27), in contrast to the 
availability of the indefinite reading in the original weatherman example, must be accounted 
for. I will argue that the asymmetry is unexpected on the third theory, while it is expected on 
both the first and the second theory.
 28
 
 According to the first theory, ‗It‘s raining‘ simply says that a raining event it taking 
place, and ‗It‘s not raining‘ says that it is not the case that a raining event is taking place. In 
both cases the literal meaning of the sentence can be enriched through some kind of tacit 
reference to a place ; thus both ‗It‘s raining‘ and ‗It‘s not raining‘ can be understood as saying 
that it is raining (or not) in Berlin, if Berlin is the contextually understood location. But the 
indefinite reading of the original weatherman sentence does not result from such a process of 
enrichment, on the first theory : the indefinite reading is what we get when we don’t enrich 
the meaning of sentence but take it at face value (i.e. as meaning that there is a raining event, 
period). If we similarly take statement (27) at face value, it says that there is no rain (i.e. there 
is no rain anywhere). It does not mean that there is no rain somewhere. 
 According to the second theory, the Earth is contextually assigned to the location 
variable in the weatherman example. Presumably, this also happens in the negative variant of 
the example ; (27) is therefore analysed as saying that on Earth, it is not raining. Is this the 
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 I am indebted to Pranav Anand for suggesting that way of testing the theories, and to Paul 
Elbourne for pointing out that the second theory passes the test, contrary to what I initially 
thought. 
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unavailable reading, and is the second theory guilty of predicting that reading? No. According 
to the second theory, the Earth is not understood as the narrow place of rain (the location 
filled by rain) in the weatherman example, but as the broad location, where the broad location 
is defined as a location that contains the narrow place of rain. In the broad sense, to say that it 
rains at a given place l is to say that there is a sub-location l’ of l which is filled by rain ; and 
to say that it does not rain (at l) is to say that there is no sub-location l’ of l which is filled by 
rain. Sentence (27), in the negative variant of the weatherman example, is therefore analysed 
as saying that on Earth, it is not raining, in the sense that there is no raining spot (i.e. it‘s not 
raining anywhere). To assign the Earth to the covert location variable in sentence (27) 
therefore results in a reading quite different from the unavailable reading Somewhere on 
Earth, it’s not raining. Being built into the lexical entry for ‗rain‘, the existential quantifier 
over (narrow) locations takes narrow scope, whereas it takes wide scope on the unavailable 
reading. 
 In contrast, the third theory has trouble accounting for the unavailability of the 
indefinite reading of (27). According to that theory, ‗rain‘ carries a location variable, which is 
optional and can be bound by a covert existential quantifier. That is what happens in the 
weatherman example. In the negative variant of the example, therefore, the existential 
quantifier is expected to interact with negation, in such a way that two readings ought to be 
generated, depending on the scope of negation : the sentence will say either that at some 
location l, there is no rain, or that it is not the case that, at some location l, there is rain. But 
the first reading is not actually available.
29
 
To be sure, as Paul Elbourne insisted in his comments on a first version of this paper, 
it is not the case that any scopal ordering of scope-bearing elements is always possible. I 
agree. But if some particular scope ordering turns out to be impossible, there must be an 
explanation for that fact. Whoever posits two scope-bearing elements which turn out not to 
                                                 
29
 In ‗Compositionality‘, Partee notes that indefinite implicit arguments, if treated as 
existentially quantified variables, are such that the existential quantifier can only take narrow 
scope relative to any other scope-bearing element in the sentence (Partee 1984a/2004 : 168-9). 
As the anonymous referee pointed out, this fact was known since the seventies (and it was one 
of the arguments in favour of a lexical approach to alleged indefinite implicit arguments). In a 
related vein, Bierwisch offered the following rule in the early eighties : whenever a lexically 
specified argument is syntactically omitted, it is bound by an existential quantifier which 
takes narrow scope (‗Unspecified Argument Rule‘ — see Bierwisch 1982, 1989 : 76). 
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interact owes us such an explanation.  For example, Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet notice 
that « there do not appear to be ambiguities resulting from interaction of the negative and 
tense morphemes » (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990 : 232). They offer a tentative 
explanation for that fact : there is no interaction between tense and negation, hence no scope 
ambiguity, they say, because the corresponding syntactic elements (NEG and TNS) are both 
parts of the INFL node, and « the elements of INFL are interpreted in a fixed order, with NEG 
always having wider scope than TNS »  (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990 : 232). 
Another example, close to our present concerns, regards the lack of interaction between 
negation and event quantification : negation always, or almost always, takes wider scope than 
the default quantification over events.
30
 Addressing this issue, Parsons writes : 
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 I say ‗almost always‘ because negation can be interpreted as predicate negation, in which 
case, of course, it does not scope over the event quantifier. In the following example, the 
second clause contains a pronoun anaphorically (or quasi-anaphorically) referring to an event 
introduced in the first clause, and that event is the event of not-doing something : 
 
Brutus did not greet me. It happened yesterday. 
 
In standard event semantics, that example, which resembles the classical ‗Brutus stabbed 
Caesar. It happened at noon‘, should be analysed in the same way : There is a past event e 
which is a non-greeting and whose agent is Brutus. That event e took place yesterday. 
Another example on the same pattern involves adverbial modification rather than event 
anaphora: 
 
With contempt, Brutus did not greet me. 
 
Again, in standard event semantics, that ought to be analysed as : There is an event e such that 
e is a non-greeting, e is located at some time t in the past, e’s agent is Brutus, and e is 
contemptful (i.e. involves contempt on the part of its agent towards its patient). Of course, not 
any old event that happens not be a greeting event will count as a non-greeting event. To 
count as a non-greeting event, an event must have been expected to be a greeting. (The 
literature on negative events is scarce. See Higginbotham 2000 : 73-75 for a few remarks on 
the topic.) 
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If there is a negation in the sentence, it must have wider scope than the default 
quantification ; this is because a sentence like ‗Maria did not run‘ says that it is not the 
case that there was a running whose agent is Maria ; if the negation occurred inside the 
default quantification, it would make the sentence say that there was an event which 
was not a running whose agent is Maria, and this would be true even if Maria did run. 
(Parsons 2000, ch. 3 : 19) 
 
I am not sure this is intended as an explanation for the fact that negation and event 
quantification do not freely interact. The passage may be read a statement of what Parsons 
takes to be a (brute) fact. But it may also be read as providing a reason for the lack of narrow-
scope reading for negation. The reason would be this : (i) ‗Maria ran‘ and ‗Maria did not run‘ 
are supposed to be contradictory, but (ii) if negation and event quantification can freely 
interact, there will be a reading of the negative sentence which will make its truth compatible 
with that of the positive sentence. That, however, cannot be the explanation for the obligatory 
wide scope of negation : when we say that ‗Maria ran‘ and ‗Maria did not run‘ are supposed 
to be contradictory, we are already excluding the possiblility of a narrow-scope reading for 
negation. Rather than accounting for that impossibility, we are presupposing it. Yet the 
putative argument can be improved if we take the Chierchia-McConnell-Ginet point about 
negation and tense for granted. If negation scopes over tense, then, if we give the event 
quantifier scope over negation, the resulting sentence ‗Maria did not run‘ will say that there is 
(tenseless) an event which is not an event located in the past and consisting of Maria running. 
That is obviously too trivial to be worth saying, or even worth expressing. 
Whatever we think of these explanations, they are (tentative) explanations. My point is 
precisely that the lack of interaction between two scope-bearing elements requires some kind 
of explanation.  A proponent of the third theory ought to provide such an explanation, since 
s/he posits two scope-bearing elements (negation, and the existential quantifier over locations) 
between which there is no interaction. Unless a convincing explanation is provided, the first 
and the second theory fare better than the third theory because they do not have this problem. 
A possible explanation for the lack of interaction between the existential quantifier and 
negation involves a small revision of the third theory. There is no interaction, one might 
argue, because there is no existential quantifier in the first place. Still, in the spirit of the 
second theory, we can maintain that something like existential quantification takes place. 
Instead of saying that the location variable is bound by a covert existential quantifier, in the 
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weatherman example, we can say that the argument slot for a location is filled by means of  a 
covert pronoun of the right sort. An impersonal pronoun, like French ‗on‘, has existential 
force, and it is characterized by the fact that it can only take narrow scope. (Thus ‗On ne 
sonne pas à la porte‘ can only mean that it is not the case that someone is ringing at the door, 
on the indefinite use of ‗on‘. It cannot mean that there is someone who is not ringing at the 
door. ) If we assume that the argument slot is filled by the (covert) counterpart of such a 
pronoun in the location domain, we account for the fact that the negation can only take wide 
scope. (Of course, an explanation has to be provided for the behaviour of impersonal 
pronouns, but that is a general problem that cannot be blamed specifically on the third 
theory.) 
 Against this variant of the third theory, I advance a methodological principle : for 
obvious reasons of parsimony, one should never posit covert syntactic elements that do no 
semantic work, unless there are independent syntactic grounds for positing them.
31
 In the 
‗rain‘ case, I claim, the alleged impersonal pronoun does no semantic work. The sheer 
existence of a raining event already entails the existence of a location where that event takes 
place ; hence the addition of an impersonal pronoun standing for a location contributes 
nothing.
32
 One should therefore refrain from positing such a covert pronoun, unless there are 
independent syntactic reasons for so doing. 
 
5.3 Against the second theory 
 
Like the first theory, the second theory has no problem with the negative version of the 
weathmerman example. What makes it possible to account for the unavailability of the wide 
scope existential reading, on the second theory, is the fact that the location relation is 
construed in the broad sense. 
 The problem with the second theory is that it cannot both have its cake and eat it : the 
idea that ‗rain‘ involves an argument slot for a location no longer permits one to distinguish 
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 An analogous principle was invoked by Irene Heim in one of her lectures at Ecole normale 
supérieure (Heim 2005). See also Jacobson (1990). 
32
 In contrast, the impersonal pronoun ‗on‘ in ‗On sonne‘ adds something to what is expressed 
by the impersonal forms ‗il sonne‘ or ‗ça sonne‘ (‗It‘s ringing‘), namely the implication that 
the ringing event has a human or human-like agent. 
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meteorological predicates from other event predicates, when the notion of  location is 
interpreted in the broad sense. 
 According to the standard view, which the second theory is meant to protect, 
meteorological predicates carry an argument slot for a location, as part of their lexical 
semantics, rather than simply in virtue of the general fact that events take place somewhere. A 
contrast is thus drawn between meteorological predicates, like ‗rain‘, and other event 
predicates, like ‗dance‘ (Taylor 2001 : 53-4). Even though ‗dance‘ is an event predicate and 
an event is bound to happen at some location, ‗dance‘ does not carry an argument slot for a 
location ; ‗rain‘ does. If we elaborate the standard view in the manner of the second theory, 
however, the contrast between ‗rain‘ and ‗dance‘ vanishes. For nothing prevents us from 
analysing ‗dance‘ the way we have analysed ‗rain‘, i.e. as involving a covert reference to 
some location, possibly the Earth, understood as the broad location of the dancing event. To 
say that Mary danced, on that analysis, is to say that there is (on Earth) some sub-location l’ 
where she danced. This captures the standard, location-indefinite reading of ‗dance‘. In other 
words, that defense of the standard view weakens it so much that the original intuition is lost. 
The original intuition was that ‗rain‘ sentences involve some form of reference to some 
specific location of rain, in the narrow sense of ‗location‘. By conceding that this need not be 
the case, one accepts my point that the contrast between ‗rain‘ and ‗dance‘ is ill founded, or at 
least exaggerated. 
 Polly Jacobson has objected to this argument against the second theory that it is too 
weak : it says that the second theory opens the door to analysing ‗dance‘ the way ‗rain‘ is 
analysed (i.e. as involving covert reference to a broad location) — thereby losing the 
distinction which the theory is meant to protect ; but nothing, she points out, would require 
the second theory to make this leap. Luisa Marti, who advocates the second theory, also fails 
to see the force of the argument (p.c.). Those reactions make me think that I should spell out 
the argument a little more, in order at least to explain why I find it compelling. 
 The basic issue is this: Do meteorological  predicates (like ‗rain‘) pattern with ‗arrive‘, 
or do they pattern with ‗dance‘ ? In the case of ‗arrive‘, there is a location slot in logical 
form ; in the case of ‗dance‘, there isn‘t. That is what the contrast between (11) and (12), 
repeated below as (28) and (29), is supposed to show. 
 
(28) A : John has arrived. 
B : Where has he arrived ? 
A : *I have no idea. 
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(29) A : John has danced. 
B : Where has he danced ? 
A : I have no idea. 
 
The standard view is that ‗rain‘ patterns with ‗arrive‘, not with ‗dance‘. I claim that, 
appearances notwithstanding, the opposite is true, and I offer the weatherman example as a 
counterexample to the standard view. The second theory is meant to protect the standard view 
from the counterexample, and I argue that it fails. It fails because, even if we accept the 
second theory, we cannot maintain that ‗rain‘ patterns with ‗arrive‘ rather than ‗dance‘ ; on 
the contrary, we must accept my view, that ‗rain‘ patterns with ‗dance‘, not with ‗arrive‘. That 
is the point of my argument. The point is that the second theory cannot do the job it is meant 
to do. So I have nothing against the second theory per se — indeed, I am willing to accept it if 
there is any good reason to do so. But that reason cannot be that, by accepting this theory, we 
protect the standard view from the counterexample — for that is not true. 
The second theory says that in the logical form of (2) there is a slot for a location, 
understood in the broad sense. Let‘s accept this. Let us accept that, putting tense and aspect 
aside, the logical form of (2) is 
 
(30) e [RAINING (e)  LOCATIONB (l, e)] 
 
where ‗l‘ is a free variable to which a value is contextually assigned. Let us compare this to 
the logical form of ‗John arrives‘. In the case  of ‗arrive‘, what the context must provide is the 
narrow location of the event, so it will not do to analyse ‗John arrives‘ along the lines of 
 
(31) e [ARRIVING (e)  AGENT (John, e)  LOCATIONB (l, e)] 
 
This is too weak and does not predict the infelicity of (28). What we want, rather, is 
something like this: 
 
(32) e [ARRIVING (e)  AGENT (John, e)  LOCATION (l, e)] 
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where ‗location‘ is understood in the ordinary, narrow sense. A speaker uttering ‗John 
arrives‘, thus analysed, is responsible for the contextual assignment of a particular value to the 
free variable ‗l‘, and this accounts for the infelicity of (28). The difference between (32) and 
the incorrect (31), modeled after (30), shows that ‗rain‘ does not pattern with ‗arrive‘. 
 When we turn to ‗dance‘, the felicity of the dialogue in (29) tells us that the logical 
form of ‗Mary dances‘ does not involve a slot for a narrow location, so it cannot be 
 
(33) e [DANCING (e)  AGENT (Mary, e)  LOCATION (l, e)] 
 
This is enough to show that ‗dance‘ does not pattern with ‗arrive‘. So we have an argument 
showing that neither ‗dance‘ nor ‗rain‘ patterns with ‗arrive‘. But no such argument can be 
mounted for showing that ‗dance‘ and ‗rain‘ do not pattern together ; for nothing prevents us 
from analysing ‗Mary dances‘ as 
 
(34) e [DANCING (e)  AGENT (Mary, e)  LOCATIONB (l, e)] 
 
Indeed, by assigning the Earth to the variable ‗l‘ in (34), we get the right truth-conditions for 
the ordinary, location-indefinite reading of ‗Mary dances‘. 
 Of course, as Jacobson points out, we do not have to analyse ‗Mary dances‘ as (34). 
But we do not have to analyse (2) as (30) either. My point is that if we want to put ‗rain‘ and 
‗dance‘ in the same category and analyse both ‗It is raining‘ and ‗Mary dances‘ on the same 
pattern, as (30) and (34) respectively, we can. The facts themselves do not object to such an 
analysis, which we may be willing, or unwilling, to consider. In contrast, whether or not we 
are willing to analyse ‗John arrives‘ as (31), such an analysis is untenable, because the facts 
themselves object : in contrast to ‗dance‘ and (as the weatherman example shows) ‗rain‘, 
‗arrive‘ demands the contextual specification of the narrow location of the event. Introducing 
broad locations into the picture does not attenuate, let alone remove, that basic contrast which 
is sufficient to establish that ‗rain‘ is more similar to ‗dance‘ than it is to ‗arrive‘. 
 
6 Alternative pragmatic accounts 
 
6.1 Contextual domain restriction 
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According to my analysis, meteorological predicates do not carry an argument slot for a 
location ; or rather, they no more carry such an argument slot than other event predicates do. 
We may, if we wish, say that every event predicate carries such an argument slot (footnote  
13) ; but then we have to acknowledge the fact that it is not mandatory to fill that slot by 
specifying the location of the event. Either way, the standard view regarding meteorological 
predicates must be given up : it is not true that a location has to be contextually provided 
when none is explicitly mentioned by a meteorological sentence. ‗Rain‘ is just like ‗dance‘ in 
this respect. The only difference between meteorological predicates and other event predicates 
is pragmatic : the location of the event is often relevant when the event being described is a 
meteorological event, hence it is quite typical to find tacit reference to a place in 
meteorological utterances — more typical than for other event predicates.33 
 Regarding the pragmatic process at issue when the location of the event is tacitly 
referred to, I have not said much and in this section I want to say more. Let us start with what 
I actually said. First, I said that the pragmatic process in question is an instance of free 
enrichment. What characterizes free enrichment is that it is optional : in  contrast to saturation 
(the contextual assignment of values to indexicals and free variables), free enrichment may or 
may not take place, depending on the context. That is the reason why I treat the specification 
of a location as an instance of enrichment : for a place may or may not be contextually 
specified, depending on the context — that is the lesson of the weatherman example. Second, 
I suggested that we construe the pragmatic enrichment at issue in our examples as the 
contextual provision of an extra conjunct in the scope of the event quantifier. Now both 
claims can be disputed. For example, we may think of the pragmatic enrichment at work in 
example (13B) (the ‗dance‘ case) in terms of a contextual restriction on the domain of the 
event quantifier, rather than in terms of an extra conjunct in the scope of that quantifier. 
Instead of analysing (13B) as (21), repeated below as (35), we would analyse it as (36) : 
 
(35) e t [PAST (t)  TIME  (t, e)  DANCING (e)  AGENT (John, e)  ALL-NIGHT (e)  
LOCATION (the-ball, e)] 
(36) (e : LOCATION (the-ball, e)) (t) [PAST (t)  TIME  (t, e)  DANCING (e)  AGENT 
(John, e)  ALL-NIGHT (e)] 
 
                                                 
33
 In using this difference to argue for the standard view, Corazza (2004 : 77-78) fails to 
maintain the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. 
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Thus analysed (13B) says that, among the events that took place at the ball, there was a 
dancing event whose agent was John and which lasted all night. What is contextually 
provided here is not an extra conjunct in the scope of the event quantifier, but a restriction for 
that quantifier. 
A similar analysis straigthforwardly applies to the ‗rain‘ case. Instead of analysing (2) 
as (26), repeated below as (37), we would analyse it as (38) : 
 
(37) e t [PRESENT (t)  TIME (t, e)  RAINING (e)  LOCATION (Paris, e)] 
(38) (e : LOCATION (Paris, e)) (t) [PRESENT (t)  TIME (t, e)  RAINING (e)] 
 
Here the tacit reference to a place is viewed as an instance of a familiar phenomenon : 
contextual domain restriction. ‗It‘s raining‘ literally says that there is a raining event, but may 
be contextually understood as saying that there is such an event among the events that take 
place at a certain location, just as ‗Everybody came‘ can be understood as saying that every 
member of our group came. On this construal, the reference to a place in weather sentences is 
a by-product of the contextual restriction of the event quantifier. 
 I myself have nothing against the contextual domain restriction account, which I take 
to be a variant of my proposal. Deep down, that is the account I favour. For I hold, with 
Barwise, Kratzer, and others, that every utterance is evaluated against a ‗topic situation‘ 
which the utterance concerns and the context provides. In simple cases, the topic situation is 
what restricts the domain of quantification. So the semantic content of ‗It is raining‘ is the 
proposition that there is a raining event, but this is understood as a comment about a particular 
situation, e.g. the present situation in Paris. On this view both contextual domain restriction 
and the tacit reference to a location in weather sentences are aspects of a very general 
phenomenon, viz. the tacit reference to a topic situation against which the utterance is meant 
to be evaluated. 
Be that as it may, as soon as we construe the relevant form of enrichment as related to  
contextual domain restriction, we face a significant challenge. Quantifier domain restriction, 
in general, can be understood in two ways (Recanati 2004 : 87-88, 125). On one analysis, it is 
a matter of free enrichment. We (optionally) make the meaning of the sentence more specific 
by restricting the domain of quantification, on pragmatic grounds. On this view, argued for by 
Kent Bach (2000), the literal reading of a quantificational sentence is the contextually 
unrestricted reading. But contextual domain restriction may also be treated as an instance of 
saturation. Many theorists believe that quantifier phrases carry a domain variable to which a 
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value must be contextually assigned. If that is so, then treating the tacit reference to a location 
as an instance (or by-product) of contextual domain restriction would not be a treatment in 
terms of free enrichment, but in terms of saturation ; and this approach arguably leads us to 
something very close to the Marti-Elbourne view. 
Let us assume that quantifier phrases are indeed associated with domain variables 
which must be contextually assigned values, as many semanticists believe. On this view the 
alleged unrestricted reading — as when ‗everybody‘ is interpreted as meaning everybody in 
the whole world — results from assigning the maximal domain to the domain variable. So that 
reading is not the ‗literal‘ reading in contrast to the pragmatically enriched, restricted readings 
— it is only the particular case in which the contextual restriction turns out to be empty 
because the maximal domain is selected. If we take this line, what will prevent us from saying 
something similar in the ‗rain‘ case ? The tacit reference to a place which we find in typical 
meteorological utterances will be said to result from the contextual assignment of a value to a 
variable in logical form, namely the domain variable which the event quantifier carries. The 
domain variable is assigned the set of events that take place at such and such a location. The 
indefinite or existential reading observed in the weatherman case will then be accounted for as 
follows : in this particular case, the domain variable is assigned the set of events that take 
place… anywhere on Earth. 
Of course, the suggestion that the covert event quantifier itself carries a covert domain 
variable seems strange, and may be resisted. One is tempted to argue that only overt 
expressions can carry covert elements. But we don‘t have to think of the contextual restriction 
of the event quantifier in terms of higher-order covertness. If we hold, as seems reasonable, 
that whenever there is quantification the context must provide a relevant domain, then we will 
say that whenever covert event quantification occurs, the context must provide a domain of 
events over which to quantify. And that means not that the covert quantifier carries a covert 
variable, but merely that the covert quantifier that has to be provided in the course of 
interpreting the sentence is itself a restricted quantifier, where the restriction depends upon the 
context. So the covert event quantifier is associated with a variable domain, rather than with a 
domain variable. This makes no difference to the present argument. The weatherman example 
can still be handled by saying that the domain that is selected in this particular case is the set 
of events corresponding to the maximal location. 
I mentioned the situation-theoretic view, according to which contextual domain 
restriction is a by-product of the tacit reference to a topic situation. Does this particular take 
on contextual domain restriction avoid the problem I have just raised for my account ? I do 
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not think it does. Even if we hold, as I do, that the topic situation is not represented in the 
semantic content of the utterance, but only comes into the picture as the ‗circumstance‘ 
relative to which the content is evaluated, still it is a necessary constituent of the global, 
‗Austinian‘ proposition expressed by the utterance, which Austinian proposition goes beyond 
semantic content proper and incorporates the contextually provided situation. Since a topic 
situation has to be provided in the course of evaluating the utterance, it is reasonable to 
maintain that, in a certain sense, the contextual provision of that situation is a matter of 
(mandatory) saturation rather than of (optional) enrichment.
34
 And if we say that, then the 
problem arises in the same terms as before. 
To sum up, as soon as we treat the contextual provision of a place in weather 
sentences in terms of contextual domain restriction, we open the door to an analysis of 
contextual place-specification in terms of saturation rather than enrichment. Such an analysis 
contradicts my own proposal and denies the optional character of place-specification. Or so it 
seems. 
 But does it really ? I am not so sure. Even if we take the tacit reference to a place in 
weather sentences to be a by-product of contextual domain restriction, and simultaneously 
construe contextual domain restriction as an instance of saturation, I think my proposal is not 
deeply affected, appearances notwithstanding. That is so for two reasons. First, the (possibly 
empty) restriction of the domain of the event quantifier has to take place in all cases, whether 
the predicate at issue is a meteorological predicate or any event predicate (e.g. ‗dance‘). So 
we can maintain that ‗rain‘ patterns with ‗dance‘ (rather than with ‗arrive‘). Second, the 
variable to which a value must be contextually assigned is not a location variable, but a 
domain variable.
35
 Only in certain cases, determined on pragmatic grounds, will the 
contextual restriction of the event quantifier take the form of the contextual specification of a 
place. It is therefore possible to maintain that meteorological predicates do not carry an 
argument slot for a location, or no more carry such an argument slot than other event 
predicates do. Whenever there is tacit reference to a location, it takes place for pragmatic 
                                                 
34
 I say ‗in a certain sense‘ because, in the ‗Austinian‘ framework, we don‘t really have to 
choose between saturation and enrichment. The provision of a topic situation through which 
contextual domain restriction is effected is a matter of enrichment if we focus on semantic 
content proper, and a matter of saturation if we focus on the complete Austinian proposition. 
35
 Or, if we eschew talk of variables for the reasons mentioned above : what is contextually 
provided is not a variable location, but a variable domain for the event quantifier. 
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reasons and casts no light on the semantics of meteorological predicates. That is my point, 
and it remains. 
I conclude that my proposal is not threatened if we shift to an account in terms of 
contextual domain restriction. I will therefore remain officially agnostic about the two issues I 
have raised in this section : 
 
- whether the contextual specification of  a place is best construed as the tacit provision 
of an extra conjunct in the scope of the event quantifier, or as a by-product of the 
process of contextually restricting the domain of quantification ; 
- whether contextual domain restriction itself is best construed as an instance of free 
enrichment or as an instance of saturation. 
 
6.2 Meaning shift 
 
As a referee for this journal put it, it takes work to get a location-indefinite reading for ‗rain‘ : 
the weatherman scenario is a ‗cleverly constructed scenario‘. This raises an objection I have 
heard many times since the publication of my paper ‗Unarticulated Constituents‘. 
The objection runs as follows. If what is at issue is the contrast between ‗rain‘ and 
other predicates which do carry a covert argument and therefore cannot be given an indefinite 
reading, then it's only fair to ask for some exertion of similar cleverness with respect to them. 
Now if we do try hard enough, then we can provide indefinite readings for those predicates 
which, according to me, require the contextual provision of a definite argument to fill a slot 
set up at the lexical level. My favorite examples — those which I mention time and again in 
‗Unarticulated Constituents‘— are ‗notice‘ and ‗finish‘. If I say ‗John noticed‘, there must be 
something contextually salient and identifiable such that it is that thing which John is said to 
have noticed. The sentence cannot be understood in the indefinite sense : John noticed 
something or other (or so I claimed). And the same thing holds for ‗finish‘ : ‗John has 
finished‘ cannot be used to say that he has finished something or other. Now, according to the 
objection, we can get such ‗indefinite‘ readings if we try hard enough and exert as much 
cleverness as I did in constructing the weatherman scenario. 
The first person who raised that objection was Ilaria Frana, then a student of Sandro 
Zucchi. She came up with the following scenario for ‗finish‘ : 
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We are in a factory. The factory produces tinned food and is equipped with a special 
machine that carries out all the activities concerned with the production. The special 
machine manages hundreds of activities, from the preparation of the food to the 
printing of the labels for the cans. In order to save time, all the activities are carried 
out in parallel. There is a rule that says that the factory can‘t be closed until the 
machine has finished at least one of its daily activities. When the machine finishes an 
activity a bell rings. (Since the machine does many activities in parallel, it is possible 
that more than one activity is finished at the same time). Now, imagine someone 
hearing the bell ring and uttering : « Ok, the machine has finished. You can switch it 
off and go home ». In this context [the sentence ‗the machine has finished‘] means that 
the machine has finished at least one of its activities, but no activity in particular. 
(Frana 2002 : 18-19) 
 
A while later I received two additional scenarios from Sam Wheeler III, a philosopher of 
language at the University of Connecticut : 
 
Finishing: 
Therapists are monitoring a large group of patients suffering from Fred‘s Syndrome, a 
pathological tendency to start projects and never complete them. A new drug, 
Completin, is being tested. Patients are monitored by graduate students, who push a 
button every time a patient finishes a project. ―Patient #271 has finished,‖ says the 
researcher, looking at the console. ―John has finished‖ can mean ―John has finished 
something or other‖. 
  
Noticing: 
Another kind of psychological disorder, hyperconcentration, in which patients 
thinking about mathematics fail to register stimulations from their environment (a kind 
of mathematical coma.) Once again, researchers are testing a drug, Whatsthatin, that 
enhances noticing. A variety of stimulations are randomly applied to a group of 
patients who have been given Whatsthatin. In a few patients, neural signals indicate 
that they have noticed. ―Patient #271 has noticed.‖  ―John has noticed‖ seems to be 
able to mean ―John has noticed something or other.‖ 
  
Finally, a referee for this journal joined the choir : 
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Consider a scenario with a patient who has been in a semi-coma, and a technician in 
another room is reading the output of an EEG or whatever it is that measure brain 
activity in various areas of the brain. It seems to me that a trained technician could 
know when brain activity signals 'noticing', and since for the semi-coma patient, the 
fact that he's noticing (something) is all that's important, one might imagine the 
technician being able to shout "He's noticing!" without being in any position to know 
or say what it is that the patient is noticing. 
 
Some of the examples may not be convincing. For example, one might argue that in 
the Frana example a specific activity is referred to as being what the machine has just 
completed, namely, the activity the machine was currently engaged in. Frana tries to block 
that move by saying that the machine does several things in parallel. Still one could say that 
what the machine is said to have finished is that activity it was engaged in that was closest to 
completion. Frana insists that the machine can also finish several tasks at the same time. I am 
still not wholly convinced, but this is not important. Whatever one thinks of this particular 
example, I concede that, by exerting enough cleverness (as the referee puts it), it is possible to 
come up with occurrences of ‗finish‘ or ‗notice‘ for which the argument slot is not filled with 
a specific value provided by the context, but is existentially bound. Such occurrences are 
marginal, however, and I think they can be handled by saying that in such cases a meaning 
shift occurs — the words are taken in a special, deviant sense. 
In the neurological examples provided by Wheeler and the referee, instead of giving to 
‗notice‘ its standard value, namely 
 
x y e [NOTICING (e)  AGENT (x, e)  THEME (y, e)] 
 
I think we give it a shifted value tailored to the context, namely 
 
x e [y [NOTICING (e)  AGENT (x, e)  THEME (y, e)]] 
 
The shifted value is easy to account for : it can be obtained by applying Quine‘s Der operator 
(or a close relative) to the standard value. As I said in section 1.3, Der applies to any n-place 
predicate and yields a n
-1
-place predicate by existentially quantifying the last argument-role of 
the original predicate. Der contributes what, in ‗Unarticulated Constituents‘, I called a 
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variadic function : a function that increases or decreases the adicity of a predicate. Functions 
which, like that contributed by Der, decrease the adicity of the predicate I call (following 
Tesnière) recessive functions. The meaning shift effected by Der may itself be called a 
recessive shift. 
 In the case of ‗eat‘ too, I invoked the Der operator to account for the shift from the 
transitive to the intransitive use. That shift is lexicalised (conventionalized) in the case of 
‗eat‘, but in the case of ‗notice‘ and ‗finish‘ I hold that the very same recessive shift can be 
triggered contextually. In the same way, some metonymic or metaphoric shifts are lexicalized, 
but others aren‘t. Even those that are lexicalized must have started their career as purely 
contextual meaning shifts. As the French linguist Emile Benveniste once put it, paraphrasing 
the famous empiricist dictum, ‘nihil est in lingua quod non prius fuerit in oratione’. So I don‘t 
think we have trouble accounting for special uses of ‗finish‘ and ‗notice‘ such as those that 
occur in the examples above, and I don‘t think that they threaten my claim that saturation of 
the relevant argument slots is mandatory in the case of ‗finish‘ and ‗notice‘. When I say that 
it‘s mandatory (rather than optional) I mean that it is made obligatory by the lexical semantics 
of ‗notice‘ and ‗finish‘, that is, by their conventional meaning or standard semantic value. It is 
not my intention to deny that those lexical items can also be given nonstandard semantic 
values if the context triggers a pragmatic function resulting in a meaning shift. What is 
mandatory from the standpoint of the standard value may no longer be so when we shift to a 
nonstandard value. (On meaning shifts in general, see Nunberg and Zaenen 1992, Nunberg 
1995, Partee 1998 : 342-51.) 
 Once I have made this concession, however, I have to answer the crucial objection : 
why not say the same thing about ‗It‘s raining‘ ? Why not say that it is mandatory to provide a 
value for the location parameter, unless a recessive shift occurs and ‗rain‘ contributes the 
shifted predicate Der (RAIN) rather than the standard predicate RAIN ? In view of the 
possibility of such meaning shifts the weatherman example does not force us to give up the 
standard view, according to which ‗rain‘ carries an argument slot for a location. The 
weatherman example can be handled by saying that, in that special context, a meaning shift 
takes place and ‗rain‘ does not carry its standard value. 
 I fully agree that this is a possible move to make — a possible theory to hold. My 
hunch is that there is a difference between the neurological uses of ‗finish‘ and ‗notice‘ on the 
one hand and the weatherman example on the other hand. Both types of example involve 
special scenarios, but I think the former examples are nonstandard uses in a sense in which 
the latter is not. This, however, cannot be established until we devise finer-grained tests for 
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literalness than those that are currently available. As things stand, I must grant that two 
pragmatic accounts of the weatherman example are in competition. One account is 
incompatible with the standard view. It says that the location-specific readings of ‗It‘s 
raining‘ result from a free pragmatic process of enrichment, a process that takes place most of 
the time but not always (as the weatherman example shows). The other account is compatible 
with the standard view. It says that the location-indefinite readings of ‗it‘s raining‘ (e.g. the 
weatherman example) result from a free pragmatic process of meaning shift, in virtue of 
which ‗rain‘ contributes the predicate Der (RAIN) rather than RAIN to the (modified) logical 
form of the sentence. 
The two competing accounts have something in common. In both cases we account for 
the intuitive truth-conditions of a range of examples by appealing to free pragmatic processes 
that map the bare logical form of the sentence to its modified logical form. Thus the first 
account appeals to free enrichment to go from 
 
e t [PRESENT (t)  TIME (t, e)  RAINING (e)] 
 
to 
 
e t [PRESENT (t)  TIME (t, e)  RAINING (e)  LOCATION (Paris, e)] 
 
or possibly to 
 
(e : LOCATION (Paris, e)) (t) [PRESENT (t)  TIME (t, e)  RAINING (e)] 
 
The other account appeals to a recessive function (corresponding to Quine‘s Der operator) to 
take us from the alleged standard denotation of ‗rain‘, viz. 
 
l e [RAINING (e)  LOCATION (l, e)] 
 
to its alleged nonstandard denotation in the context of the weatherman scenario, viz. 
 
e [l [RAINING (e)  LOCATION (l, e)]] 
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Even though one account, but not the other, is compatible with the standard view 
regarding meteorological predicates, from a general methodological point of view the two 
accounts are very similar. Both accept the existence of what King and Stanley (2005) call 
‗strong pragmatic effects‘, that is, effects of context on truth-conditions that are not triggered 
by the linguistic material (e.g. by indexicals or free variables in need of contextual values) but 
are pragmatic through and through. Such pragmatic effects are responsible for the difference 
between what I called the bare logical form of an utterance and its pragmatically modified 
logical form — a difference which has been a recurring theme in this paper and to which I 
will return in the conclusion. 
 
6.3 Free enrichment without unarticulated constituents 
 
I have just conceded that the weatherman example could be accounted for in terms of variadic 
shift, and that such an account would be compatible with the standard view regarding 
meteorological predicates. But this suggests, wrongly, that an account in terms of variadic 
shift is an alternative to an account in terms of free enrichment. 
 Actually there are two distinct issues. One issue concerns the direction of analysis. 
Which reading of meteorological verbs is the bare, literal reading : the location-specific 
reading or the uncommon location-indefinite reading illustrated by the weatherman example ? 
On the recessive account, the literal reading is the location-specific reading, and the other 
reading results from a free pragmatic process of recessive shift, through which the verb is 
assigned a nonstandard semantic value. This is just like the neurological uses of ‗notice‘ in the 
above examples. On the free-enrichment account I have advocated, the verb does not carry a 
location slot on its literal reading, and it is only through the pragmatic process of free 
enrichment that a location is contextually specified for the meteorological event. So the 
direction of pragmatic analysis is reversed. But this issue pertaining to the direction of 
analysis is distinct from, indeed orthogonal to, another issue, which concerns the pragmatic 
mechanism at stake or the tools to be used in the analysis. Thus it is possible to build an 
account that takes the location-less reading as basic and the location-specific reading as 
pragmatically derived, while appealing to the notion of variadic shift to account for the 
pragmatic derivation of the latter from the former. Such an account would be a particular 
implementation of the free-enrichment account I have advocated, rather than a competitor. 
 Variadic shifts can be either recessive (i.e. adicity-decreasing) or expansive (adicity-
increasing). Thus we can introduce a variadic operator, Loc, that adds a location argument-
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role to the argument structure of the input predicate. If we take the basic argument structure of 
the predicate RAIN not to carry such an argument role, then the predicate Loc (RAIN) will carry 
such an argument role. The variadic shift effected by Loc will take us from the standard 
denotation of ‗rain‘, viz. 
 
e [RAINING (e)] 
 
to its shifted denotation under ‗Loc’, viz. 
 
l e [RAINING (e)  LOCATION (l, e)] 
  
Is this what we want ? Not quite. The ordinary uses of ‗It‘s is raining‘ tacitly refer to a 
specific place, and if we want to account for such tacit reference on pragmatic grounds, we 
have to somehow incorporate it into the meaning shift. The relevant shift must do two things : 
(i) add an argument role to the argument structure of the input predicate, and (ii) fill that role 
with a specific value provided by the context. This dual role is characteristic of adverbial and 
prepositional phrases on McConnell-Ginet‘s account (McConnell-Ginet 1982). So if I say that 
it is raining in Paris, the phrase ‗in Paris‘ does two things : add a location dimension, and 
specify a value (Paris) on that dimension. That can also be done implicitly, through contextual 
clues. In such cases the pragmatic process which enriches the basic meaning of the predicate 
by specifying the location of the event can be represented as a variadic shift accompanied by 
the specification of a contextual value for the added argument role. In ‗Unarticulated 
Constituents‘ I have, to that effect, decorated the Loc operator with a subscript corresponding 
to the contextually provided location : 
 
[[LocParis (RAIN)]] = e [RAINING (e)  LOCATION (Paris, e)] 
 
We see that, through that sort of meaning shift, we can enrich the logical form of an utterance 
through the provision of an implicit location for the described event. Far from being an 
alternative to the free enrichment account, a meaning shift along those lines constitutes an 
implementation of the free enrichment account. 
 This implementation of free enrichment can be seen as an alternative to the Perry-style 
implementation in terms of ‗unarticulated constituents‘. According to Perry and his followers, 
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unarticulated constituents defeat what Perry calls the principle of ‗homomorphic 
representation‘ (Perry 1986/2000 : 174) and Crimmins the principle of ‗full articulation‘ : 
 
A semantics assumes that a statement is fully articulated, when each item that it uses 
to generate the content of the sentence (each « input » to the composition rules for 
sentences of that kind) is itself the content of some expression within the sentence. For 
example, it is plausible that a use of the sentence ‗Rex is now scratching‘ is fully 
articulated. The proposition expressed is generated from Rex, the property of 
scratching, and the time of the statement. And for each of these « building blocks » of 
the proposition, there is an expression in the sentence with that building block as its 
content (‗Rex‘, ‗scratching‘, and ‗now‘). A principle of compositionality satisfies the 
constraint of full articulation if it entails that every statement it concerns is fully 
articulated. (Crimmins 1992 : 10) 
 
A sentence such as ‗It‘s raining‘ (said while tacitly referring to a particular location, e.g. 
Paris) is said to violate full articulation because the proposition that it expresses in context 
involves a particular place to which nothing in the sentence corresponds. The place tacitly 
referred to is an ‗unarticulated constituent‘ of the proposition contextually expressed by the 
sentence, since nothing in the sentence specifically stands for it. But on the meaning-shift 
implementation of free enrichment, there is no violation of full articulation. What the 
proposition contains is the property of raining-in-Paris (or the property of being-a-raining-
event-in-Paris), and there is an expression in the sentence with that property as content, 
namely the verb ‗rain‘ which is assigned that enriched content as a result of the pragmatic 
shift. 
Of course, the property of being-a-raining-event-in-Paris can be analysed into the 
simpler properties of being a raining event and taking place in Paris, but that does not make 
Paris a constituent of the proposition, in violation of full articulation ; for if that were the case, 
then ‗Rex is scratching‘ would not be fully articulated either, contrary to what Crimmins 
assumes. The property of scratching can itself be analysed into a number of simpler 
properties, like the property of using one‘s claws ; and there is nothing in the sentence ‗Rex is 
scratching‘ that specifically stands for the claws. Does it make Rex‘s claws an unarticulated 
constituent of the proposition expressed by ‗Rex is scratching‘ ? Obviously not. If it did, 
hardly any statement would be fully articulated. 
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At the end of §6.1 I said that the contextual specification of a place may be construed 
either as the tacit provision of an extra conjunct in the scope of the event quantifier, or as a 
by-product of the process of contextually restricting the domain of quantification (or of 
contextually specifying the circumstance of evaluation). In the present section I have 
suggested a particular implementation of the former option. The extra conjunct is introduced 
in the scope of the event quantifier by lexical means : it is because, in context, the verb ‗rain‘ 
comes to mean rain-in-Paris that the location of the raining event ends up being specified and 
part of the utterance‘s truth-conditions. Since the location gets specified as part of the 
contextual meaning of a particular lexical item, the principle of full articulation is not 
violated. However, it may be that the best analysis is that which takes the place to be provided 
in the course of specifying the situation with respect to which the utterance is meant to be 
evaluated. On that alternative account it makes sense to say that the place is an unarticulated 
constituent of the (Austinian) proposition expressed by the utterance. 
 According to the Austinian account sketched in §6.1, the place of rain is an aspect of 
the topic situation, and the topic situation is not articulated by anything in the sentence ; nor is 
it part of the content that is evaluated with respect to that situation. No place is mentioned in 
the content, which is simply the proposition that there is a raining event ; but that content is 
evaluated with respect to a particular situation (involving a particular place : Paris) and the 
utterance, therefore, is true if and only if there is a raining event in Paris. The global, 
Austinian proposition involves a particular place, but the content which (alongside the 
situation) is a constituent in that Austinian proposition does not involve a place. In this 
framework the principle of full articulation holds only with respect to the content in the 
narrow sense, i.e. that which is evaluated against the contextually provided situation. The 
content in question is fully articulated ; what is not fully articulated is the Austinian 
proposition itself, since the situation component in it is not articulated. 
If, in the ‗rain‘ case, there are two options available, in other cases an account based 
on contextual domain restriction would be far-fetched. In such cases the natural analysis is in 
terms of an extra conjunct in the scope of the event quantifier. Let us look at one such case, in 
order to motivate the type of implementation I have advocated. Consider the well-known 
example : 
 
I have eaten 
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Suppose this is said to decline an invitation to dinner. The utterance then means that the 
speaker has eaten (i) dinner (ii) on that evening (Sperber and Wilson 2002 : 607-12). If the 
speaker has eaten a couple of peanuts, or if she has eaten three days before, that would not be 
sufficient to make what she has said (intuitively) true in this context. So there is implicit 
reference both to the temporal interval during which the eating event has taken place (viz. the 
evening on which the utterance is made) and to the theme of the eating event (viz. dinner). 
Now the implicit reference to the time interval can plausibly be handled in terms of contextual 
domain restriction, but the implicit reference to the type of thing eaten (a regular dinner rather 
than a few peanuts) is more naturally construed as introducing an extra conjunct in the scope 
of the event quantifier. The utterance can therefore be given the following analysis : 
 
( e : THIS-EVENING (e)) (t) [PAST (t)  TIME (e, t) EATING (e)  AGENT (the speaker, e)   
THEME (dinner, e)] 
 
Does this mean that the theme of the eating event is an unarticulated constituent of the 
proposition, in violation of full articulation ? The appeal to unarticulated constituents strikes 
me as implausible and unnecessary in such a case. The implicit reference to the type of thing 
eaten is best analysed in terms of a meaning shift making the sense of ‗eat‘ more specific than 
it literally is. If the hearer says, in the same context, ‗I have not eaten‘ and the hearer replies : 
‗but you have – I saw you eating a peanut‘, the speaker will respond : ‗That is not what I call 
eating‘, and he will be right. In this context ‗eat‘ means eat dinner, just as, in certain contexts, 
‗to drink‘ means to drink alcohol. Again, this is conventionalized, at least in the ‗drink‘ case ; 
but what has got conventionalized is a meaning shift that makes the sense conveyed by the 
expression more specific than the literal sense. Rather than say that a new constituent has 
been contributed to the interpretation without corresponding to anything in the sentence, in 
violation of full articulation, it is more satisfactory to say that the word ‗eat‘ in this context 
has acquired a specific sense which makes it equivalent to ‗eat dinner‘. On this way of 
looking at things free enrichment takes as input the regular meaning delivered by the semantic 
interpretation of some expression in the sentence and yield as output a more specific meaning 
for that expression, in such a way that there is no violation of full articulation. 
 
7. Conclusion : Pragmatics and Logical Form 
 
7.1 Truth-conditional pragmatics 
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My first goal in this paper has been to cast doubt upon the standard view regarding 
meteorological predicates, and to argue for an alternative analysis. Even though I have done 
my best, I have to admit that the issue is far from settled. I have argued against a defense of 
the standard view based on optional variables (§5.2), but the evidence I have adduced is not 
decisive. The main difficulty I have raised for that defense is that there is (so far) no 
convincing explanation for the lack of interaction between negation and the alleged existential 
quantifier, but it may well be that such an explanation is forthcoming. Also, in §6.2, I have 
conceded that, pending finer-grained tests for literalness, an account of the weatherman 
example in terms of a recessive shift works as smoothly as my favored account in terms of 
free enrichment. This is a significant concession since an account based on the idea of 
recessive shift would be compatible with the standard view. 
My second goal, however, has been to use this case study to support a general 
methodological position I have long been arguing for, and which I call ‗Truth-Conditional 
Pragmatics‘ (TCP). Now the account based on the idea of recessive shift would support this 
position just as much as the account in terms of free enrichment. That is why I face the 
possibility of such an account light-heartedly.  
TCP is the view that the effects of context on truth-conditional content need not be 
traceable to the linguistic material in the uttered sentence. Some effects of context on truth-
conditional content are due to the linguistic material (e.g. to context-sensitive words or 
morphemes which trigger the search for contextual values), but others result from ‗top-down‘ 
pragmatic processes that take place not because the linguistic material demands it, but 
because the utterance‘s content is not faithfully or wholly encoded in the uttered sentence, 
whose meaning requires adjustment or elaboration in order to determine an admissible content 
for the speaker‘s utterance. 
The extra step required to get from conventional meaning to admissible content is 
usually treated as external to truth-conditional content proper, because truth-conditional 
content proper is supposed to be independent from pragmatic considerations unless such 
considerations are forced upon the interpreter by the linguistic material itself. Now we can 
perhaps characterize a notion of literal content such that literal content is, by definition, 
independent of pragmatic considerations (unless such considerations are imposed by the 
linguistic material itself), but when it comes to the intuitive truth-conditions of an utterance, 
TCP holds that they result, in part, from pragmatic processes that are not triggered by the 
linguistic material. Free enrichment is a case in point, as is the recessive shift talked about in 
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§6.2. Assuming that semantics is to account for the intuitive truth-conditions of utterances, it 
must make room for ‗free‘ or ‗top-down‘ (pragmatically controlled) pragmatic processes, just 
as it makes room for ‗bottom-up‘ (linguistically controlled) pragmatic processes in order to 
secure contextual values for the context-sensitive elements in the sentence. 
What I said in §6.3 of free enrichment and its compatibility with full articulation can 
be generalized to free pragmatic processes in general : they take as input the meaning 
delivered by the semantic interpretation of some expression and yield as output the modulated 
meaning that will undergo semantic composition with the meanings of the other expressions 
in the sentence. In other words, I suggest that the composition rules determine the value of a 
complex expression on the basis of the pragmatically modulated values of the parts, 
according to formula (F): 
 
(F) I (a^b) = f(g1(I(a)), g2(I(b))) 
 
In that formula ‗I‘ stands for the interpretation function, ‗a^b‘ stands for a complex expression 
formed from the parts ‗a‘ and ‗b‘, and the ‗g‘s are free higher-order variables ranging over 
available pragmatic functions (including identity, which gives us the ‗literal‘ case).36 The 
formula says that the semantic value of a complex phrase a^b is a function of the pragmatic 
values of the parts, where the ‗pragmatic values‘ in question are what we get when we subject 
the literal semantic values of the parts to pragmatic modulation. Pragmatic modulation covers 
optional processes such as free enrichment, loosening, metonymic transfer, etc. : processes 
which (arguably) affect the intuitive truth-conditions but which take place for pragmatic 
reasons, without being triggered by the linguistic material in an obligatory manner. 
One way of understanding the formula is to say that semantic composition itself is a 
context-dependent process : in the course of deriving the semantic value of a complex 
expression, one optionally modulates the semantic values of the parts, and it is the context 
which determines which pragmatic function, if any, comes into play and yields the modulated 
value that undergoes semantic composition. This corresponds to the view which, in my book 
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 I am indebted to Gennaro Chierchia for discussion of the overall picture which I am 
presenting here. 
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Literal Meaning, I called ‗Pragmatic Composition‘.37 Another, even more radical way of 
understanding the formula corresponds to a view put forward by Gennaro Chierchia in 
connection with scalar implicatures (Chierchia 2004). On Chierchia‘s picture, the 
interpretation ‗function‘ is no longer a function but a relation. Adapting Chierchia‘s idea, we 
would say that each expression denotes a set of admissible values: the same linguistic form 
can receive an indefinite number of distinct, alternative denotations, depending on which 
optional pragmatic processes (which ‗g‘s distinct from identity) come into play. Thus ‗tiger‘, 
in the right context, comes to mean ‗representation of tiger‘, ‗straight‘ comes to mean 
‗approximating straightness‘, and so on and so forth. Those modulated meanings are the 
building blocks out of which the meaning of complex phrases like ‗stone lion‘ or ‗pretty 
straight‘ are built. A stone lion is not a (real) lion, and something that is pretty straight is not 
(really) straight. That suggests that in those phrases, the words ‗lion‘ and ‗straight‘ get a 
modulated value, distinct from their standard semantic value. 
Whichever construal we favour, it is important to realize that the variables over 
pragmatic functions that occur in formula (F) are there only in the theorist‘s metalanguage. 
They are not supposed to be present at any level of syntactic structure in the object-language. 
That is, indeed, what defines free pragmatic processes: they are not triggered by a variable in 
the syntax, or anything of the sort, but take place for purely pragmatic reasons — in order to 
adjust the conventional meaning of the words to the situation at hand. Even though they have 
an impact on truth-conditional content, they are a matter of use, not a matter of conventional 
meaning. 
The claim which TCP makes regarding the role of free pragmatic processes in the 
determination of intuitive truth-conditional content is an empirical conjecture about natural 
language. Other philosophers of language (Stanley 2000, Szabo 2000, King and Stanley 2005) 
have made the opposite conjecture, more in line with traditional ways of thinking about 
meaning and truth-conditions. Since it gives up those traditional assumptions, TCP sounds 
revolutionary, but I think it is entailed by influential accounts of central phenomena of 
language use such as metonymy (Nunberg 1979, 1995) or loose talk (Lasersohn 1999). Be 
that as it may, how revolutionary TCP really is depends upon how it is interpreted. In the final 
two sections I will distinguish several possible interpretations of the crucial difference which 
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 Recanati 2004 : 138-40. See Jackendoff 1997 : 47-67 and 2002 : 387-94 for a similar notion 
of ‗enriched composition‘, and Pagin (2005) for a general discussion of context-dependence 
and compositionality. 
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TCP posits between the bare logical form of an utterance and its modified logical form 
(affected by free pragmatic processes). The last interpretation I will mention is so 
conservative and deflationary that it sounds like a denial of TCP rather than an endorsement. 
 
7.2 Logical form 
 
Although variables for pragmatic functions are confined to the metalanguage and are not 
syntactically projected, still there are two possible ways of looking at the role played by free 
pragmatic processes. One construal is ‗syntactic‘ and the other one is ‗semantic‘ (Recanati 
2002: 339-42, Stanley 2005a: 237). 
On the semantic construal, what I have called the ‗modified‘ logical form of an  
utterance, resulting from the intervention of free pragmatic processes, is not a level of 
syntactic representation at all. It is only a perspicuous representation, in the theorist‘s 
metalanguage, of the utterance‘s intuitive truth-conditions, which truth-conditions result from 
interpreting the utterance‘s (bare) logical form in accordance with formula (F) above. On this 
view the ultimate level of syntactic representation is the bare logical form — the logical form 
in the usual sense — and free pragmatic processes come into play purely as a matter of 
interpretation. They do not give rise to a further level of syntactic representation. 
According to Jason Stanley (2000), this construal of free pragmatic processes is 
untenable because the meaning ingredients allegedly resulting from modulation can enter into 
binding relations. Thus we can say 
 
Everwhere I go, it rains 
 
and this shows that the implicit reference to a place has to be syntactically articulated by a 
variable in order to be bound by the quantifier ‗everywhere I go‘. I am not convinced by this 
argument, since binding relations can be handled within a variable-free framework. Be that as 
it may, nothing prevents us from accepting that free pragmatic processes map logical forms to 
a further level of syntactic representation, and nothing prevents the representations at that 
level from containing bound variables not present in the bare logical form. That further level 
of syntactic representation is the modified logical form on the ‗syntactic‘ construal. 
The syntactic construal of free pragmatic processes is widespread in the pragmatic 
literature : it is the view favoured by Kent Bach, by Relevance Theorists such as Dan Sperber, 
Deirdre Wilson, and Robyn Carston, and by Steven Neale, among others. Jerry Fodor, Noam 
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Chomsky, and Ray Jackendoff also seem to hold that view. Unfortunately, differences in 
theoretical framework and terminology make it hard to state what these authors have in 
common in a form both relatively concise and acceptable to all them. So I will not try — 
instead I will present the overall picture in a manner which they may not like but still enables 
me to make sense of much of what they say.  
The overall picture is as follows. There is a level of syntactic representation that 
incorporates « whatever features of sentences structure (1) enter directly into the semantic 
interpretation of sentences, and (2) are strictly determined by properties of sentence 
grammar » (Chomsky 1976 : 305). Chomsky calls it ‗LF‘. Representations at that level are 
then mapped to more elaborate representations « which may involve belief, expectations and 
so on in addition  to properties of LF determined by grammatical rule ». These representations 
are the modified logical forms on the syntactic construal, and they are the representations 
whose semantic interpretation yields the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance. While the 
bare logical form of a sentence is strictly determined by the grammar, its modified logical 
form depends upon pragmatic considerations. 
Since they are not strictly determined by the grammar, modified logical forms do not 
belong to the language system, but to a different ‗system of representation‘, as Chomsky puts 
it. Fodor speaks of a language of thought, and he insists that what gets compositionally 
interpreted is not what is determined strictly by the grammar but the modified logical form 
which is a syntactic representation in the language of thought, and which is affected by 
pragmatic processes and world knowledge (Fodor 2001 : 12-13). 
 Jackendoff emphasises the heterogeneity between the two systems of representation : 
the linguistic system and the conceptual system. In his framework, additional ‗rules of 
correspondence‘ are needed to bridge the gap between the syntactic structures of language 
and syntactic representations in the language of thought (Jackendoff 1993 : 31). Other 
theorists (e.g. Ludlow 1999 : 164-9, Chierchia 1999 : c-ci) have denied the alleged 
heterogeneity : logical forms are already representations in the language of thought — they 
are conceptual representations.
38
 Logical forms are conceptual representations that are strictly 
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 Thus Chierchia (1999 : c-ci) : « The  hypothesis of a logical form onto which syntactic 
structure is mapped fits well with the idea that we are endowed with a language of thought, as 
our main medium for storing and retrieving information, reasoning, and so on. The reason 
why this is so is fairly apparent. Empirical features of languages lead linguists to detect the 
existence of a covert level of representation with the properties that the proponents of the 
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determined by the grammar (and as such belong to the language system), but as conceptual 
representations they can also be elaborated or modified through non-linguistic considerations. 
On this view, which has the merit of simplicity, logical form is the interface between 
language and thought. The bare logical form of a sentence is a conceptual representation that 
is determined strictly by the grammar, while the modified logical form is a conceptual 
representation which has been shaped, in part, by extralinguistic factors such as world 
knowledge and contextual expectations. 
 To sum up, there are at least three interpretations for the distinction between the bare 
logical form and the modified logical form : 
 
Semantic construal : 
The bare logical form is a level of syntactic representation. 
The modified logical form is not (it is only a representation, in the metalanguage, of the 
intuitive truth-conditions of the object-language sentence). 
 
Syntactic construal 1 : 
The bare logical form is a level of syntactic representation. 
The modified logical form is also a level of syntactic representation, but it belongs to the 
conceptual system rather than to the language system. 
The two systems are heterogeneous. 
 
Syntactic construal 2 : 
The bare logical form is a level of syntactic representation. 
The modified logical form is also a level of syntactic representation. It belongs to the 
conceptual system rather than to the language system, but the two systems are not 
heterogeneous : the bare logical form, which belongs to the language system, is already a 
conceptual representation in the language of thought. 
 
These three interpretations do not exhaust the options. There is also a third syntactic construal 
which has emerged recently in the literature : 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
language of thought hypothesis have argued for on the basis of independent considerations. It 
is highly tempting to speculate that logical form actually is the language of thought. » 
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Syntactic construal 3 : 
The bare logical form is a level of syntactic representation. 
The modified logical form is also a level of syntactic representation. It belongs to the 
language system. Moreover, it is the same level of syntactic representation as the bare logical 
form : far from constituting two levels of representation for the same sentence, the so-called 
‗bare logical form‘ and ‗modified logical form‘ of an utterance are actually the logical forms 
of two distinct sentences standing in a certain relation to each other. 
 
On that construal, as we shall see, the variables for pragmatic functions are articulated in the 
syntax. So, in a sense, there is no free pragmatic process. In another sense, however, there are 
such processes, but they must be redescribed and accounted for in terms of the free generation 
of pragmatic variables in the syntax. 
 
7.3 Covert optionals 
 
According to the third syntactic construal, what I call the modified logical form of an 
utterance just is its (standard) logical form, and what I call its bare logical form is nothing but 
the logical form of another sentence, superficially indistinguishable from it. Take the sentence 
‗There is a lion in the middle of the piazza‘, and assume that as a result of (what I take to be) 
an optional process of modulation, the word ‗lion‘ here is understood as it is in the phrase 
‗stone lion‘. Then, according to the view under discussion, what I take to be the modified 
logical form of the sentence is its logical form, and what I call its bare logical form is not its 
logical form at all: it is the logical form of the distinct, homophonous sentence ‗There is a lion 
in the middle of the piazza‘ which means that there is a real lion in the middle of the piazza. 
What allegedly distinguishes the two sentences is the occurrence in the first one, but not in the 
second one, of a covert, optional element, e.g. a covert metonymic operator (or whatever 
accounts for the modulation of ‗lion‘ in this context). The element in question has the 
following properties : 
 
1. It is covert – that is why there is no superficial difference between the two sentences. 
2. It is optional, hence it is always possible for what looks superficially like the same 
sentence not to carry that covert element and therefore not to have the meaning that results 
from the addition of that element. 
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Elements that have those properties I will call ‗covert optionals‘. By positing the existence of 
such elements in the language, one can account for the effects of free pragmatic processes 
while claiming that they are not pragmatic processes at all, but regular processes of semantic 
intepretation applied to covert elements. Such a view has been put forward by Luisa Marti 
(2004), by Josef Stern (2000, 2006), and by Polly Jacobson (2005).
39
 
 As an example, take metaphor, discussed by Stern. An expression is interpreted 
metaphorically, according to Stern, if and only if a covert ‗Mthat‘-operator applies to that 
expression — a context-sensitive operator for which Stern supplies a Kaplan-inspired 
semantics. The ‗Mthat‘-operator is optional : whenever it occurs, it is also possible to build a 
sentence indistinguishable from the metaphorical sentence but with a different meaning (since 
the alternative sentence does not carry the ‗Mthat‘-operator that is responsible for the 
metaphorical interpretation). Stern suggests that the same sort of account will work for 
metonymy. Similarly, Luisa Marti posits covert optionals to account for all the cases for 
which I appeal to free enrichment. Whenever I invoke a free pragmatic function that makes 
the meaning of an expression more specific, Marti posits a covert variable g which is 
assigned, in context, that very function as its semantic interpretation. On that picture the 
alleged difference between free enrichment and saturation is simply a difference between two 
types of covert elements : those which, like the g variable in question, are optional and can be 
omitted without making the sentence ungrammatical or otherwise deviant, and those which 
cannot be omitted. In ‗John is short‘, a covert variable (for a comparison class or whatever 
serves as implicit parameter) is also  involved but it is not optional : whenever what looks 
superficially like the sentence ‗John is short‘ is uttered, the covert element has to be there. But 
the covert elements that account for metaphors, metonymies, free enrichment etc. are 
characterized by their optionality. They may be generated in the syntax but they need not be.
40
 
So there will be two sentences ‗It is raining‘ on Marti‘s re-description of the free-enrichment 
account : one that involves a covert variable and one that does not. When ‗It is raining‘ is 
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 One may also interpret in this light the ‗syntactic‘ analysis of scalar implicatures put 
forward by Danny Fox (2005). On that analysis scalar implicatures result from the free 
insertion of a covert exhaustivity operator Exh with a meaning akin to that of ‗only‘. 
40
 When they are  generated, they must be semantically interpreted and, if they are variables, 
they must be assigned a contextual value : so they are very different from the ‗optional 
variables‘ discussed in earlier sections. What is optional is their generation, not their 
interpretation. 
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understood as meaning that it is raining in Paris, the sentence with the variable is involved, 
and the variable is contextually assigned the function that maps RAIN to RAIN-IN-PARIS. In the 
weatherman example, assuming my analysis, the other sentence (without the free variable) is 
involved. As Marti writes, 
 
The crucial difference between Recanati‘s system and the one proposed here resides in 
what bears the responsibility for optionality. In Recanati‘s system, that is the 
responsibility of the pragmatics, of the properties of the context of utterance. In the 
system proposed here, the pragmatics has the same responsibility it has in the 
intepretation of pronouns, and only that. That is, given a variable at LF, there has to be 
a variable-assignment, which depends on the context of utterance, that provides values 
for this variable. But the pragmatics does not trigger anything, in the sense of 
Recanati. Whether a variable is generated in the syntax or not is left completely free. 
The system tries out different derivations, and only those that comply with all the 
principles of grammar, including/in addition to Gricean principles, is successful. 
(Marti 2004 : 14) 
 
How are we to account for the difference between covert optionals and other covert 
elements ? In her editorial comments on Marti‘s paper, Polly Jacobson says that covert 
optionals are nothing but covert adjuncts, and it is of the essence of adjuncts to be optional 
(since their type is a/a).
41
 Indeed, we noticed the connection between free enrichment and 
adjuncts when we introduced the optionality test for implicit arguments (§2.2). In terms of 
covert adjuncts, however, one cannot account for recessive functions and other pragmatic 
functions which change the type of their input (assuming there are such functions). 
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 In a related vein, Jacobson shows that quantifier domain restriction can be accounted for in 
terms of covert relative clauses freely adjoined to the nouns (Jacobson 2005). Thus ‗every 
girl‘ can be either : 
every [N girl] (contextually unrestricted reading) 
or : 
every [N girl [RC PRO]] (contextually restricted reading). 
Contextual domain restriction on this account is a matter of assigning a value to a silent 
variable. As always with covert optionals, the assignment is obligatory ; what is optional is 
the generation of the variable. 
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Marti has another explanation for the alleged difference between standard ‗saturation‘ 
variables and her ‗free enrichment‘ variables: there is only one sort of covert variable, she 
says, and the difference between the two types of case is simply that something in the 
sentence imposes the presence of the covert variable in some cases (e.g. ‗short‘ does) while in 
other cases the presence of the covert element is not imposed by anything in the sentence and 
could be omitted without ungrammaticality : 
 
There are cases in which a variable must always be generated next to a particular 
verb/adjective, and cases where no variable can. But that is a property of the 
verbs/adjectives themselves, not of the variables (Marti 2004 : 15) 
 
Such a story does not explain why some covert optionals (e.g. the alleged metaphorical or 
metonymic operators) are never imposed by the linguistic material around. Nor does it explain 
why they are never ruled out. On this point I tend to agree with Stanley‘s criticism of Stern : 
  
Virtually any term can be used metaphorically. This suggests that metaphor has to do 
with the use of a term, rather than the semantics of a particular expression. Similarly, 
virtually any term can be used with a deferred reference. This suggests that the 
phenomenon of deferred reference does not have to do with the semantics of any 
particular construction. Rather, it involves how we can use constructions that have a 
certains semantics to communicate something different than such constructions 
semantically express. (Stanley 2005a : 229) 
 
 Whatever we think of the line pursued by Marti, Jacobson and Stern, however, I think 
it has to be counted as another — admittedly deflationary — syntactic construal of free 
pragmatic processes. The main difference with the other two syntactic accounts is that 
everything is now done within the language system : on this account, what I call pragmatic 
modulation takes place through (i) the free generation of additional elements in the (covert) 
syntax, and (ii) the semantic interpretation of those elements along familiar lines. The 
resulting view sounds diametrically opposed to TCP, but the appearances may be deceptive. 
As far as I can tell, the only substantial difference there is between that account and the 
second syntactic account is that the level of syntactic representation to which the additional 
elements belong remains within the confines of the language system (rather than involving a 
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shift to the conceptual system). What this difference exactly amounts to — what its 
consequences are — remains to be determined. 
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